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THE WILL AS AN IMPLIED UNILATERAL
ARBITRATION CONTRACT
E. Gary Spitko*
Abstract
A consensus has begun to develop in the case law, the academic
commentary, and the statutory reform movement that a testator’s
provision in her will mandating arbitration of any challenge to the will
should not be enforceable against a beneficiary who has not agreed to the
arbitration provision, at least where the will contestant, by his contest,
seeks to increase his inheritance outside the will. Grounding this
consensus is the widespread understanding that a will is not a contract.
This Article seeks to challenge both the understanding that a will is not a
contract and the opposition to enforcement of testator-compelled
arbitration provisions that arises from that understanding.
This Article argues that a will is part of an implied unilateral contract
between the testator and the state in which the state offers to honor the
testator’s donative intent, and the testator accepts and provides
consideration for the offer by creating and preserving wealth.
Importantly, the greater contract respecting donative freedom of which
the will is a part also includes a provision for the distribution of an
individual’s intestate property in line with that individual’s imputed
intent should the individual fail to execute an effective estate plan.
Similar to a testator, a property owner who has failed to make an effective
estate plan accepts this offer of intestate distribution through her industry
and thrift. This Article’s theory borrows from the law respecting implied
unilateral contracts arising from employee handbooks in concluding that
it should be of no moment that the property owner is unfamiliar with the
specifics of the state probate code. Rather, the critical factor should be
that the state has, through its offer to respect donative intent, created an
atmosphere that is “instinct with an obligation” and that encourages
diligence and the prudent management of wealth.
The conclusion that a will is a contract between the testator and the
state grounds this Article’s additional argument that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) and state arbitration statutes require enforcement
of a testator-compelled arbitration provision contained in a will even
against a beneficiary who has not agreed to the arbitration provision.
Settled arbitration law in conjunction with third-party beneficiary theory
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or direct benefits estoppel theory supports binding the beneficiary to the
will’s arbitration contract. A virtue of this Article’s theory—that the will
and the intestacy statutes are both clauses in a greater donative freedom
contract—is that the analysis escapes the limitations inherent in the
dominant understanding that a will’s arbitration clause, if enforceable at
all, can be enforced only against a beneficiary who seeks, by his will
contest, to increase his inheritance under the will as opposed to
circumstances in which the donee seeks to increase his intestate
inheritance. According to the conventional wisdom, even if arbitration
clauses are enforceable in some testamentary instruments, they govern
only a narrow range of claims. This Article’s implied unilateral contract
theory goes further and expands the universe of arbitrable contests.
Specifically, this Article’s theory is the first that encompasses even a will
contest that seeks to render the will a complete nullity.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of arbitration to resolve a probate dispute that parties would
otherwise litigate in court has much to recommend it.1 Arbitration of a
will dispute offers the potential for a faster and less expensive resolution
than probate litigation in court.2 Will contest arbitration also typically has
1. See, e.g., Pray v. Belt, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 670, 680 (1828) (commenting that an arbitration
clause in a will was “given for the purpose of preserving peace, and preventing expensive and
frivolous litigation”).
2. See Dominic J. Campisi, Alternatives to Litigation in Trust and Probate Proceedings,
42 ARB. J. 30, 31–32 (1987); David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary
Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1030, 1035–36 (2012); Stanard T. Klinefelter & Sandra P.
Gohn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Its Value to Estate Planners, 22 EST. PLAN. 147, 151
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the virtue of being private, keeping the private and personal facts at issue
in the dispute out of public view.3 Moreover, arbitration of a probate
dispute allows for the selection of a decision maker with expert
knowledge relating to the matter in dispute.4 Such expertise typically
might include, for example, specialized knowledge of the tax aspects of
estate planning.5 It also might include a familiarity with the testator’s
values and thus a fuller appreciation of how those values influenced the
testator’s estate plan.6 The hope is that the decision of an arbitrator with
(1995); Bridget A. Logstrom, Bruce M. Stone & Robert W. Goldman, Resolving Disputes with
Ease and Grace, 31 ACTEC J. 235, 235 (2005) (“Our collective gut tells us that the administration
of a will or trust would run more efficiently and at less cost if we could resolve disputes arising
in those proceedings through the use of an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum.”); Stephen Wills
Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 627, 630, 635 (2011).
3. Horton, supra note 2, at 1035–36; Bridget A. Logstrom, Arbitration in Estate and Trust
Disputes: Friend or Foe?, 30 ACTEC J. 266, 267 (2005) (“Arbitration hearings are not public
record and, therefore, may help to keep private details of family disputes private.”); Murphy,
supra note 2, at 635–36; cf. Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in
the Law of Trusts, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 725–26 (2006) (describing how the details of a trust that
otherwise would have remained private might become public during trust litigation in the civil
court system); Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More Than Money: Mediation Clauses
in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 553–54 (2008) (asserting in support
of the use of mediation clauses in estate planning instruments: “A decedent who fears contest of
her dispositions would undoubtedly prefer to avoid the spectacle of a trial in which her mental
capacity, or her susceptibility to undue influence, is the central issue”); John R. Phillips, Scott K.
Martinsen & Matthew L. Dameron, Analyzing the Potential for ADR in Estate Planning
Instruments, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 15 (2006) (“For some clients, the primary
impetus for implementing the dispute resolution processes into trusts is confidentiality, often
overriding concern about litigation costs.”).
4. Cf. S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1157, 1184 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes] (suggesting
that because “trust law can be quite specialized as a matter of both procedural and substantive
law,” the settlor of a trust might especially value a decision maker with expertise in the subject
matter).
5. See Robert L. Freedman et al., ADR in the Trusts and Estates Context, 21 ACTEC
NOTES 170, 171 (1995) (“In many areas of the country the probate judges are becoming less and
less specialized, while the trusts and estates practice, especially the tax aspects, has become
increasingly specialized. Would it not be better in the future to try a trusts and estates case before
an ACTEC Fellow than before a probate judge or a jury?”).
6. E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
275, 297 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Protecting the Abhorrent Testator]; see also Richard Z.
Kabaker, Joseph F. Maier & Frank Gofton Ware, The Use of Arbitration in Wills and Trusts, 17
ACTEC NOTES 177, 183 (1991) (“A testator’s choice of executor, friend, or relative as umpire is
logical given their personal knowledge of the testator’s desires.”); Blaine Covington Janin,
Comment, The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 521,
532 (1967) (“Because the settlor or the parties are free to select those whom they wish to decide
future controversies, arbitrators may be chosen either on the basis of their knowledge in areas
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a fuller appreciation regarding the testator’s estate plan would be less
likely to be grounded in ignorance or prejudice.7 In sum, arbitration of a
probate dispute seems to offer many of the virtues that have made
arbitration an increasingly popular means for dispute resolution in other
contexts, such as with respect to the resolution of commercial and
employment disputes.8
The weight of available evidence, however, strongly suggests that
arbitration is not extensively utilized to resolve will contests.9 It is
reasonable to suspect that unsettled questions relating to the
enforceability of testator-compelled arbitration provisions contribute to
this underutilization10: Given that typically a party’s principal motive for
most likely to become the subject of dispute or because of their familiarity with the settlor and
beneficiaries.”).
For an argument that arbitration theory and doctrine should more fully embrace arbitration’s
potential to promote the autonomy of disputants to pursue shared values, see Michael A. Helfand,
Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE L.J. 2994,
2999–3000 (2015).
7. Spitko, Protecting the Abhorrent Testator, supra note 6, at 296–97 (arguing that
arbitration allows a minority-culture testator to appoint a decision maker who is familiar with and
respectful of the values that informed the drafting of the estate plan and, thus, to overcome biases
inherent in traditional probate litigation).
8. To facilitate arbitration of disputes relating to wills and trusts, the American Arbitration
Association has promulgated “Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures.” See
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES
(2012), www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_024438; see also E. Gary
Spitko, A Critique of the American Arbitration Association’s Efforts to Facilitate Arbitration of
Internal Trust Disputes, in ARBITRATION OF INTERNAL TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (S.I. Strong ed.) (forthcoming Oxford Univ. Press 2016) [hereinafter Spitko,
Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes]. The introduction to those rules and procedures asserts that
“[a]rbitration is an effective way to resolve these disputes [relating to wills and trusts] privately,
promptly, and economically, utilizing as the arbitrator a lawyer or lawyers with substantial
experience in the area of wills, trusts and estates.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra, at 6.
9. See Freedman et al., supra note 5, at 170 (“Arbitration . . . is rarely used in the trusts
and estates context.”); Robert D. W. Landon, II & John L. McDonnell, Jr., Using Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Trust and Estate Planning and Contested Matters, course materials from
the ACTEC Summer 2003 meeting, St. Paul, Minnesota (June 2003) (reporting on an “informal”
survey of 122 ACTEC Fellows from California and Florida that found that 111 of the fellows
reported never having used a mandatory requirement of arbitration in an estate planning
document, while eight of the fellows reported having used a mandatory arbitration requirement
between one and ten percent of the time).
10. See Logstrom, Stone & Goldman, supra note 2, at 237–38 (commenting that estate
planners and their clients desire a more certain answer to the question of whether an arbitration
provision in a will or trust would be enforceable); Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra
note 4, at 1163 (“[T]he minimal use of mandatory arbitration provisions in trusts may be due to
concerns about the enforceability of such clauses.”).
This Article is concerned with the enforcement of executory arbitration clauses in wills,
which call for arbitration of disputes arising in the future. The enforcement of arbitration
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utilizing arbitration is to save time and expense in resolving a dispute, a
likelihood that the estate will have to invest time and expense in litigating
the enforceability of a testator-compelled arbitration clause would tend to
discourage the use of such a clause.11
In general, the issue of whether a testator may force his intestate heirs
and the takers under his will to arbitrate any challenge to his will remains
unresolved in most jurisdictions.12 Very little modern case law addresses
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in wills or in other estate planning
instruments such as trusts.13 The sparse case law and academic
commentary that exists on this point, however, suggests that a consensus
is developing that a testator may not compel arbitration of contests to her
will.14
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the principal impediment to the
acceptance of the validity of a testator-compelled arbitration clause in a
will is the widely shared and long-held understanding that a will is not a
submission agreements, which call for arbitration of existing probate disputes, is somewhat less
problematic and is not the focus of this Article.
11. Cf. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1163 (asserting with respect
to trust litigation that “[n]o lawyer wants his or her client to be the precedent-setting test case in
a developing area of law, even if the outcome is ultimately in the client’s favor”).
12. Horton, supra note 2, at 1030; Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts:
Defining the Parameters for Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB.
L.J. 118, 119 (2011); S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the
Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J.
275, 287 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Empowering Settlors] (noting that “many U.S. states have
not yet addressed issues” concerning the enforceability of mandatory trust arbitration).
13. See McArthur v. McArthur, 224 Cal. App. 4th 651, 656 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting the lack
of case law on the issue of whether a trust’s arbitration clause can bind a trust beneficiary); Rachal
v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. 2013) (“There is a dearth of authority as to the validity of an
arbitration provision in a trust . . . .”); Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory
Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, but
Are They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 351, 354 (2007) (“[T]he extent to which
courts will enforce such [trust mandatory arbitration] clauses under existing law is unclear.”);
Logstrom, Stone & Goldman, supra note 2, at 237–38 (commenting that “[t]he question with a
less obvious answer is whether arbitration can be mandated by a testator or settlor in a will or trust
in a way that is enforceable,” but suggesting that “[t]he answer appears to be ‘yes’”); Phillips,
Martinsen & Dameron, supra note 3, at 10 (“Just as there is little case law or scholarly
commentary about arbitration clauses in estate planning documents, there is even less authority
regarding the ability to bind the trust beneficiaries to an arbitration clause involving disputes
relating to the trust.”).
14. See In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 409–10 (D.C. 2006) (holding that a will is not a
written contract to arbitrate subject to enforcement under the District of Columbia’s version of
the Uniform Arbitration Act); Murphy, supra note 2, at 641; cf. Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d
1078, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a trust is not a written contract within the purview
of the Arizona statute providing for enforcement of arbitration agreements), superseded by statute,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2015), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262,
2011 WL 601598, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011).
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contract.15 This understanding has influenced the case law on testatorcompelled arbitration.16 It has also arguably cabined the thinking of
scholars and the ambitions of reform efforts in this area.17
It is indeed axiomatic that arbitration is a creature of contract.18 It is
unquestionable as well, however, that the first principle of American
donative transfer law is respect for the donor’s wishes19: The Restatement
(Third) of Property states, “Property owners have the nearly unrestricted
right to dispose of their property as they please.”20 Indeed, American law
respects freedom of testation to a greater extent than does the law
anywhere else in the world.21
These bedrock principles—arbitration as a creature of contract and
respect for donative freedom—on their face appear incompatible in a case
in which a testator has directed in his will that any challenge to the will
15. See Tzena Mayersak, Examining the Use of Arbitration and Dealing with Decedent’s
Wishes in Wills, Trusts and Estates, 12 EUR. J.L. REF. 404, 404–05 (2010) (commenting that
“[o]ne of the biggest obstacles regarding the use of arbitration in areas associated with estate
planning is that wills and trusts are not considered contracts” and proposing as a partial solution
the use of pre-drafting contracts between a testator or settlor and those who would be the
beneficiaries); Murphy, supra note 2, at 639–43 (“[T]he few courts that have considered the
matter have agreed that an arbitration provision in a trust or a will is not binding on its
beneficiaries or trustees, because arbitration provisions are only binding when included in a
written contract.”); cf. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1209–12 (discussing
the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in trusts and explaining that “many
jurisdictions require [that] an arbitration agreement . . . reflect certain contractual qualities”).
For early assertions of the proposition that the will is not a contract, see In re Bates’ Estate,
134 A. 513, 513 (Pa. 1926) (“[A] will is not a contract, but a mere expression of intention, to take
effect after testator’s death, and subject, in the meantime, to revocation or such changes as the
maker may deem expedient.”); Martz’s Ex’r v. Martz’s Heirs, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 361, 365 (1874)
(“It cannot be said with any propriety that a will is a contract.”).
16. See infra notes 36–59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 60–74 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (“The [Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)] reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract.”); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The organizing principle of the American law of
donative transfers is freedom of disposition.”); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in
Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed.,
1977) (“It is often said that the principle of freedom of testation dominates the law of the United
States.”); id. at 12 (asserting that testamentary freedom “is a leading principle in the United
States”).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts. a,
c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
21. See, e.g., RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE
AMERICAN DEAD 6–7, 58–62, 154 (2010) (“American law grants more rights to the dead than any
other country in the world.”); Friedman, supra note 19, at 19 (“American law is quite special too
in the degree of freedom of testation that it grants.”).
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must be arbitrated, yet the will contestant has withheld her consent to
arbitrate her will contest. This Article seeks to reconcile these two
principles in such circumstances. In sum, this Article argues that
enforcement of testator-compelled arbitration is wholly consistent with
the general legal and normative principles that ground contract law,
arbitration law, and the law of donative transfers.
Part II of this Article argues that the will should be considered a
contract within the purview of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and
state arbitration statutes. Part II also argues that those who have failed to
see a contract in a will have been looking in the wrong place. Courts and
commentators are correct that a will is not a contract between the testator
and the legatee, the devisee, or the heir. Nonetheless, a will is indeed a
contract. A will sets out the terms of a contract between the testator and
the state: a will is, in essence, part of an implied unilateral contract
pursuant to which the state offers to give effect to the testator’s donative
wishes at his death, and the testator accepts the offer and gives
consideration for the contract by creating wealth, preserving and
investing his property, and refraining from wasting his estate.
Moreover, the will is but one clause of a greater contract entered into
between the state and its citizen respecting donative freedom. State
intestacy statutes are a second important part of this greater “donative
freedom contract.” Intestacy statutes provide a default estate plan that
governs the disposition of a decedent’s property to the extent that the
decedent did not make an effective alternate plan of disposition during
her life.22 The primary objective of the intestacy statutes is to approximate
the donative intent of the typical intestate decedent.23
Thus, pursuant to the intestacy clause of the greater donative freedom
contract, the state promises that should the property owner fail to express
effectively his donative intent with respect to the passing of his property
at death, the state will nonetheless honor his imputed intent. The state will
do so by passing the intestate decedent’s property at his death to his
heirs24—those whom the state believes the typical intestate decedent most
likely would have chosen to favor had he effectively expressed his
22. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 645 (2014). Much of default law allows for contracting out. For example,
spouses-to-be may opt out of the law governing equitable distribution of property upon divorce
through the use of a premarital agreement. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (“[T]here is today
widespread agreement, in principle, that such [premarital] agreements may be enforceable.”). In
the inheritance law context, the state’s intestacy scheme provides a default law from which one
may opt out by means of a will or a will substitute. See Sitkoff, supra, at 645.
23. Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 645.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 1999).
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donative intent. Like the testator, one who has failed to execute an
effective estate plan accepts the state’s offer and gives consideration for
the contract by creating wealth, preserving and investing her property,
and refraining from wasting her estate.
A virtue of this Article’s theory that the will and the intestacy statutes
are both clauses in a greater donative freedom contract is that the analysis
escapes the limitations inherent in the dominant understanding, discussed
below, which restricts enforcement of testator-compelled arbitration
provisions to those circumstances in which the donee seeks by her will
contest to increase her inheritance under the will as opposed to
circumstances in which the donee seeks by her will contest to increase
her intestate inheritance. According to the conventional wisdom, even if
arbitration clauses are enforceable in some testamentary instruments,
they govern only a narrow range of claims.25 This Article’s implied
unilateral contract theory goes further and expands the universe of
arbitrable contests. Specifically, this Article’s theory is the first one that
encompasses even a will contest that seeks to render the will a complete
nullity.
Part III of this Article considers generally the extent to which an
arbitration clause in a will that is understood to be a contract should be
enforceable against a donee who has not consented to arbitrate a dispute
related to the will. Part III concludes that the donee’s refusal to consent
to arbitration should be utterly irrelevant, as a legal and normative matter.
Compelling a donee to arbitrate his will contest when he has not agreed
to arbitrate is consistent with the law of donative transfers, a cardinal
principle of which is that the rights of the donee are wholly derivative of
and subordinate to the rights of the testator.26 Enforcing a testatorcompelled arbitration provision against the unwilling donee also is
consistent with the law of arbitration. Settled arbitration doctrine provides
that a court may compel a non-signatory to an arbitration provision to
arbitrate her claim arising from the contract containing the arbitration
clause if the relevant state contract law allows the container contract to
be enforced against the non-signatory.27 As Part III further demonstrates,
courts may utilize both third-party beneficiary theory and equitable
estoppel theory to bind the donee to a will’s arbitration clause.
Finally, Part IV of this Article addresses the argument that an
arbitrator who derives his authority to decide a will dispute from the will
should not have the power to adjudicate a challenge to the validity of that
will. The argument, in short, is that if the will itself is invalid, then the
grant of authority to the arbitrator is also necessarily invalid. Implicit
acceptance of this argument appears in the limited nature of recent
25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra notes 159–68 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 169–90 and accompanying text.
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statutory reform efforts. For example, some reform efforts seek to
validate testator-compelled arbitration with respect to suits to construe a
will but stop short of authorizing an arbitrator to decide a contest to the
validity of the will.28 Part IV also discusses the arbitration doctrine of
separability and differentiates between the circumstances under which
the doctrine should confer authority on an arbitrator to adjudicate a
challenge to the validity of a will that gave rise to her authority to serve
as the arbitrator in the first place, and the circumstances under which the
doctrine should not confer such authority.
I. ARBITRABILITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO SEE
THE WILL AS A CONTRACT
To better appreciate the widespread understanding that a will is not a
contract and the argument against the enforceability of a testatorcompelled arbitration clause deriving from this understanding, it is
helpful to consider whom the testator seeks to bind pursuant to the
arbitration clause. A testator’s direction that any challenge to his will
must be arbitrated would directly affect only those who have standing to
challenge his will. Thus, the rules for standing to challenge a will define
the universe of those whom the testator might seek to bind with the
arbitration clause. To have standing to challenge a will, one must have a
direct pecuniary interest in the success of the will contest.29 Thus, a
testator’s heir who would take more under the intestacy statutes than she
would take under the will would have standing to challenge the will.30
Also, a legatee or devisee under the will or under a previous will who
would take more if the will contest is successful would have standing.31
The understanding that neither the will nor the arbitration clause
contained in the will is a contract relates to the fact that neither the
testator’s heir nor his beneficiary under the will has consented to the
terms of the will or exchanged a promise with the testator in consideration
for the terms of the will.32
28. See infra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
29. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF
SUCCESSION INCLUDING INTESTACY AND ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS’ ESTATES § 99, at 519
(2d ed. 1953).
30. Id. at 519–20.
31. See id. at 521.
32. See In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1086, 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding
that “a trust is not a contract” and “that the undertaking between the settlor and trustee is not
properly characterized as contractual and does not stem from the premise of mutual assent to an
exchange of promises”); Lah v. Rogers, 707 N.E.2d 1208, 1212, 1216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
(asserting that a trust is not a contract but rather reflects the settlor’s “unilateral decision” to place
her assets into a trust); Martz’s Ex’r v. Martz’s Heirs, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 361, 365–66 (1874)
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The argument against testator-compelled arbitration continues with
the language of federal and state arbitration statutes aimed at abrogating
the common law hostility to the enforcement of executory arbitration
agreements.33 Section 2 of the FAA provides in relevant part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.34
Thus, the FAA’s plain language suggests that one may not invoke the
FAA to enforce an arbitration provision in a will unless the will is a
contract. The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) and the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA), from which most state arbitration law derives,
have provisions substantially similar to Section 2 of the FAA, although
the RUAA uses arguably broader language referencing “an agreement
contained in a record” to arbitrate.35
(concluding that the will is not a contract and asserting that “[t]he very essence of a genuine will
is[] that it is the voluntary, independent, individual act of the testator”).
In developing his argument that a trust is a contract between a settlor and a trustee governing
the management and distribution of trust assets, Professor John Langbein hints that a will might
be treated as a contract between a testator and an executor. See John H. Langbein, The
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 637 (1995) (“[E]xecutorship, like
trusteeship, exhibits the twin features of contractarianism—consensual formation and consensual
terms.”).
33. Many examples exist of judicial hostility toward arbitration in the context of a probate
dispute. See, e.g., In re Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351, 357 (Mich. 1936) (“No stipulation such
as here involved can oust the jurisdiction of the probate court, permit the probate judge to abdicate
his jurisdiction and power, or delegate it to a third person not a judicial officer, and no stipulation
can provide for the determination of the status of the codicil in any other manner than that
provided by statute.”); Taylor v. McClave, 15 A.2d 213, 216 (N.J. Ch. 1940) (“This court cannot
be deprived of its jurisdiction by any direction of the testator to the effect that his executor, or any
other person, other than the court, shall construe or define the provisions of a will.”); In re Reilly’s
Estate, 49 A. 939, 940–41 (Pa. 1901) (“A testator may not deny to his legatees the right of appeal
to the regularly constituted courts.”); In re Will of Jacobovitz, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (Sur. Ct.
1968) (“The probate of an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased
and the distribution of an estate can not [sic] be the subject of arbitration under the Constitution
and the law . . . of New York and any attempt to arbitrate such issue is against public policy.”).
34. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
35. Compare UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1955) (“A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between
the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”), with UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(a) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2000) (“An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or
subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/2

10

Spitko: The Will As An Implied Unilateral Arbitration Contract

2016]

IMPLIED UNILATERAL ARBITRATION CONTRACT

59

The seminal case declining to enforce an arbitration clause in a will
on the ground that a will is not a contract is In re Calomiris.36 In
Calomiris, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to hear an
appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration because the
court held that there was no contract containing an arbitration provision.37
Calomiris involved an arbitration provision contained in a will, which
directed that parties use arbitration to resolve any material dispute
between trustees of a trust that the will established.38 The court of appeals
held that a will is not a contract within the purview of the District of
Columbia’s version of the UAA and, therefore, the court had no
jurisdiction to hear an appeal relating to the will’s arbitration provision.39
In holding that a will is not a contract, the Calomiris court quoted the
Arizona Court of Appeals’ reasoning in the influential case of
Schoneberger v. Oelze,40 which had held that a trust is not a contract
within the purview of Arizona’s arbitration act.41 The Schoneberger
court, in a portion of its opinion that the Calomiris court found

36. 894 A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006).
37. Id. at 410.
38. Id. at 408.
39. Id. at 410–11.
40. 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410205 (2015), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598, at *2
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011).
41. See In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409–10 (discussing Schoneberger, 96 P.3d 1078). In
Schoneberger, the trust settlors included an arbitration provision in each of three trust instruments
establishing three irrevocable trusts. 96 P.3d at 1079–80. The arbitration provision provided in
part that “disputes in connection with this Trust shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Id. at 1080. Some years later, two of the trusts’
beneficiaries sued the settlors as well as the trustees of the trusts alleging breach of trust and, in
particular, that the defendants had mismanaged and dissipated trust assets. Id. The defendants
moved to compel arbitration under Arizona’s arbitration statute, which was derived from the UAA
and, similar to the FAA, provided that “[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy
to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter
arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (2015)). The defendants argued that although the beneficiaries had not
signed the arbitration agreement, they were obligated to arbitrate as third-party beneficiaries of
the contract. Id. The defendants argued in the alternative that the beneficiaries were estopped from
objecting to arbitration since they sought benefits under the trusts (the contracts). Id. The court
held that the beneficiaries need not arbitrate their claims against the settlor and the trustee
“because such a trust is not a ‘written contract’ requiring arbitration.” Id. at 1079. “Under either
[third-party beneficiary or equitable estoppel] theory, however, defendants face a fundamental
problem that defeats their demand for arbitration: section 12-1501 required defendants to prove
the existence of ‘a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration.’ They failed to make
this showing because, as a matter of law, the trusts at issue here were not contracts.” Id. at 1082.
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“instructive,”42 emphasized that “[a]rbitration rests on an exchange of
promises,” but a trust does not.43 “The ‘undertaking’ between trustor and
trustee,” the Schoneberger court concluded, “‘does not stem from the
premise of mutual assent to an exchange of promises’ and ‘is not properly
characterized as contractual.’”44 Thus, the critical issue for the Calomiris
court in holding that a will is not a contract appears to have been that a
will does not rest upon an exchange of promises.45
More recently, in the 2013 case of Rachal v. Reitz,46 the Supreme
Court of Texas held that despite the absence of an exchange of promises,
a settlor-compelled arbitration provision in a trust is enforceable under
the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) to bind a trust beneficiary who seeks
benefits under the trust.47 In Rachal, the trust instrument provided that
“as to any dispute of any kind involving [the] Trust or any of the parties
or persons concerned herewith (e.g., beneficiaries, Trustees),
arbitration . . . shall be the sole and exclusive remedy.”48 Nonetheless, a
beneficiary of the trust later sued the trustee, alleging that the trustee had
misappropriated trust assets and had failed to provide a proper accounting
to the trust beneficiaries.49 The trustee then moved to compel
arbitration.50
The Rachal court decided the case under the TAA, which, similar to
the RUAA, provided that a “written agreement to arbitrate is valid and
enforceable.”51 The court did not hold that the trust or the arbitration
provision in the trust could be treated as a contract. Rather, the court held
that no formal arbitration contract was necessary, as the TAA required
only a written agreement to arbitrate.52 The court interpreted the term
agreement to mean a manifestation of mutual assent.53 Finally, the court
found that, in the instant case, the beneficiary manifested his assent to the
42. In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409.
43. Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083.
44. Id. (quoting In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)).
45. See In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409–10.
46. 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013).
47. Id. at 844–47.
48. Id. at 842.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001(a) (West 2015).
52. See Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 844–45; see also Rachel M. Hirshberg, Note, You Can’t
Have Your Trust and Defeat It Too: Why Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Trusts Are
Enforceable, and Why State Courts Are Getting It Wrong, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 227–28
(noting that the TAA requires only an agreement to arbitrate and arguing for a broad
interpretation of the TAA so that an arbitration clause in a trust might be enforceable against a
beneficiary).
53. Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 845.
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arbitration provision in the trust by seeking to enforce his rights under the
trust.54 In so concluding, the court relied upon the doctrine of direct
benefits estoppel. Essentially, this doctrine provides that a non-signatory
to an agreement may not seek to benefit under the agreement while
simultaneously seeking to avoid the agreement’s burdens.55 Thus, the
Rachal court held that “[i]n accepting the benefits of the trust and suing
to enforce its terms against the trustee so as to recover damages, [the
beneficiary]’s conduct indicated acceptance of the terms and validity of
the trust.”56
The reasoning of the Rachal court seemingly applies full force in a
case in which an arbitration clause is in a will rather than a trust.
Accordingly, a court may find that a legatee or devisee who seeks to
benefit under the will has assented to the will’s arbitration clause. The
doctrine of direct benefits estoppel would preclude the beneficiary from
seeking to benefit under the will while simultaneously seeking to avoid
the will’s arbitration provision.
The principal limitations of the Rachal court’s holdings would also
seem to apply full force in the case of a will’s arbitration provision. First,
the Rachal court’s analysis is a nonstarter in any case governed by an
arbitration statute that makes enforceable only arbitration “contracts” but
not arbitration “agreements.” Second, under the Rachal court’s analysis,
the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel could not be used to find an heir’s
assent to the will’s arbitration provision when the heir does not seek to
benefit under the will.57 As the Rachal court reasoned with respect to
trusts, “One who does not accept benefits under a trust and contests its
validity could not be compelled to arbitrate the trust dispute under the
doctrine of direct benefits estoppel.”58 Thus, an heir who seeks to
invalidate the will could not be bound by the will’s arbitration clause.59
Just as there is a dearth of case law addressing the enforceability of
54. See id. at 845–47.
55. Id. at 846.
56. Id. at 847.
57. See McArthur v. McArthur, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 653–54, 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
(holding that a trust beneficiary who sought to set aside a trust amendment that purported to alter
a trust’s distributive provisions and to add an arbitration clause to the trust was not bound by the
arbitration provision given that she had not accepted benefits under the trust amendment); Horton,
supra note 2, at 1060 (“[I]f an omitted heir contends that an entire trust was obtained by undue
influence, there is simply no basis to deem him to have acquiesced to any part of the instrument.”);
Murphy, supra note 2, at 649 (“If the arbitration clause was enforced based on Benefit Theory,
but a beneficiary chose to contest the will or trust, then she could still bring that action in court,
outside of the arbitration clause.”).
58. Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 850.
59. See id. at 847 (commenting that a trust beneficiary’s challenge to the validity of the trust
“is incompatible with the idea that she has consented to the instrument”).
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testator-compelled arbitration, very little scholarship addresses the
issue.60 Professor David Horton has published arguably the most
sophisticated academic treatment of the topic.61 His focus is on whether
the FAA governs an arbitration clause found in a will or trust.62
Professor Horton acknowledges at the outset that the text of the FAA,
on its face, limits the statute’s reach to arbitration clauses embedded in
“contracts.”63 Moreover, he concludes from the FAA’s legislative
history64 that “Congress almost certainly meant to limit the FAA to
arbitration clauses in ‘contracts.’”65
Nonetheless, despite his understanding that a will is not a contract,
Professor Horton concludes that “the FAA likely governs arbitration
clauses in wills and trusts.”66 Professor Horton reasons that the U.S.
Supreme Court, “[t]o further its pro-arbitration agenda,” has not applied
the law to limit the FAA’s coverage to only arbitration clauses in
contracts.67 Rather, the Court has interpreted the FAA so that it applies in
situations in which the parties have not contracted to arbitrate but have
“agreed” to arbitrate68: “As a matter of federal common law,” Professor
Horton writes, “the FAA hinges on whether the parties have agreed to
arbitrate, not whether there is a ‘contract’ in which the arbitration clause
appears. In turn, wills and trusts are capable of giving rise to agreements
to arbitrate . . . .”69
In considering whether the beneficiary has “agreed” to arbitrate,
Professor Horton expressly relies on the same direct benefits estoppel
doctrine that subsequently became the center of the Rachal court’s
analysis under the TAA.70 Professor Horton argues that, quite simply,
“parties to an estate plan can agree to arbitrate by accepting benefits under
the terms of an instrument that contains an arbitration clause.”71
Thus, Professor Horton’s analysis shares a critical limitation with the
Rachal court’s analysis: The arbitration statute will not compel an heir to
60. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1031 n.23 (noting that only one law review article “even
mentions the FAA and wills and trusts in passing”).
61. See generally id. (providing an in-depth analysis of the application of the FAA to wills
and trusts).
62. Id. at 1031–32.
63. Id. at 1049.
64. See id. at 1051–54 (reviewing the legislative history of the FAA).
65. Id. at 1032.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1032, 1054–58 (reviewing federal cases in which courts have upheld
arbitration clauses despite arguably flawed underlying contracts).
69. Id. at 1049.
70. See id. at 1061–65 (explaining how the equitable estoppel doctrine applies to
beneficiaries of testamentary instruments).
71. Id. at 1062.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/2

14

Spitko: The Will As An Implied Unilateral Arbitration Contract

2016]

IMPLIED UNILATERAL ARBITRATION CONTRACT

63

arbitrate her challenge that seeks to increase her intestate inheritance—
probate property passing to the contestant outside of the will.72 Indeed,
Professor Horton concedes that this limitation “may diminish the FAA’s
usefulness in probate” given that “[t]estators and settlors place arbitration
clauses in wills and trusts largely to minimize the expense and delay
caused by individuals who are disappointed with their gifts.”73 Professor
Horton’s analysis also shares a second critical limitation with the Rachal
court’s analysis. His approach is a nonstarter if the federal or state court
concludes that the FAA reaches only those arbitration clauses contained
in a contract.
Uncertainty surrounding the question of whether an arbitration clause
contained in a testamentary instrument is enforceable has led numerous
commentators to call for statutory reform to address the issue.74 In 2006,
for example, after more than two years of studying the issue, the
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) issued a task
force report addressing arbitration of wills and trusts disputes and
proposing model legislation that would, if enacted, authorize limited
enforcement of arbitration clauses in wills and trusts.75 The ACTEC task
force expressed its judgment that private arbitration of disputes relating
to wills and trusts utilizing an expert decision maker would lead to the
more efficient and cost-effective administration of wills and trusts.76 The
task force acknowledged, however, that uncertainty existed as to
“whether arbitration can be mandated by a person in his or her will or
trust in a way that is enforceable”77 and that the widespread
understanding that neither a will nor a trust is a contract had contributed
to this uncertainty.78
72. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 846–47 (Tex. 2013); Horton, supra note 2, at
1075 (explaining that a litigant who is not seeking to gain the advantages of the testamentary
instrument, or who challenges the existence of the instrument itself, cannot be bound by
arbitration); see also id. at 1064 (arguing that the beneficiaries’ challenge to the validity of a will
or trust “is incompatible with the idea that they have consented to the instrument”).
73. Horton, supra note 2, at 1075.
74. See, e.g., Bruyere & Marino, supra note 13, at 355, 361, 364 (arguing that, given the
unsettled state of the law, “the safest route to enforceable mandatory arbitration provisions [in
trusts] is through the state legislatures”); Murphy, supra note 2, at 661 (rejecting theories that
some have offered to validate arbitration provisions in wills and trusts, and arguing that “a better
means to properly enforce these clauses would be to act legislatively, through a statutory
amendment”).
75. See AM. COLL. OF TR. & ESTATE COUNSEL, ARBITRATION TASK FORCE REPORT 27–33 (2006),
http://msba.mnbar.org/docs/default-source/probate-and-trust-section/actec-arbitration-task-forcereport.pdf. The ACTEC task force first met in the summer of 2004 and issued its report in
September 2006. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 9.
78. See id. at 10–11.
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The task force recommended statutory reform to achieve the desired
certainty respecting the issue.79 Specifically, the task force proposed a
“Model Enforceability Act,” which states that “[a] provision in a will or
trust requiring the arbitration of disputes between or among the
beneficiaries, a fiduciary under the will or trust, or any combination of
them, is enforceable.”80 The model act goes on to clarify this language by
stating that if a person challenges the validity of the arbitration provision
“either expressly or as part of a challenge to the validity of all or a portion
of the will or trust containing the arbitration clause, [then] the court shall
determine the validity of the arbitration provision and any additional
challenge to the validity of the will or trust.”81
Thus, under ACTEC’s Model Enforceability Act, one who challenges
the validity of any portion of a will or trust would not be bound by the
arbitration provision found in the will or trust. The task force members
considered but rejected the idea of providing for a separate judicial
proceeding addressing only the validity of the arbitration clause to be
followed, if the court found the arbitration clause to be valid, by
arbitration addressing the merits of the will or trust contest.82 The drafters
feared that a two-step process “would involve two trials involving
virtually the same proof” and that the duplication would conflict with
their “goal of developing a simpler method of trial resolution.”83
Therefore, for the drafters, it became necessary to destroy arbitration to
save it.84
Since ACTEC released its task force report and recommendations in
2006, a few states have enacted legislation providing for the limited
enforcement of arbitration provisions in donative instruments. In 2007,
Florida enacted a statute based on the ACTEC model law.85 The Florida
79. Id. at 11 (“We could bring certainty to the issue by a statute allowing a testator or settlor
to require by will or trust that disputes involving the estate or trust administration be decided by
an arbitrator, rather than a court.”).
80. Id. at 27.
81. Id. at 28. The ACTEC Arbitration Task Force Report proposes a second model act, the
“Model Simplified Trial Resolution Act,” which contains enforceability provisions substantially
identical to the ones contained in the Model Enforceability Act but also includes a default process
for resolving disputes. See id. at 28–33.
82. Id. at 28 n.17.
83. Id.
84. In contrast, the FAA is unequivocally hostile to such a sentiment with respect to an
arbitration contract to which it applies. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
217 (1985) (holding that the FAA “requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent
arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would
be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums”).
85. See FLA. STAT. § 731.401 (2015); see also Murphy, supra note 2, at 665–66 (citing an
interview with Robert W. Goldman, Chair of the ACTEC Arbitration Task Force, in support of
the assertion that the Florida statute was based on ACTEC’s model law).
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statute makes enforceable “[a] provision in a will or trust requiring the
arbitration of disputes, other than disputes of the validity of all or a part
of a will or trust.”86 Thus, like the Model Enforceability Act, the Florida
statute does not apply to a will contest brought by a donee who seeks to
increase her inheritance outside of the will by challenging the will in
whole or in part, or even to a will contest brought by a donee who seeks
to increase her inheritance under one part of the will by challenging
another part of the will.
In 2008, in response to the 2004 Arizona Court of Appeals decision in
Schoneberger, Arizona enacted a statute providing that “[a] trust
instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures
to resolve issues between the trustee and interested persons or among
interested persons with regard to the administration or distribution of the
trust.”87 On its face, this statute does not apply to any will contest.
Moreover, a natural reading of the statute’s language suggests that the
statute also does not apply to any challenge to the validity of all or part
of a trust.88
Finally, in 2014, both Missouri and New Hampshire enacted
legislation authorizing the enforcement of certain arbitration provisions
imposed by the settlor of a trust on persons with an interest in the trust.89
Neither statute applies to arbitration of a will contest. Missouri’s statute
states that “a provision in a trust instrument requiring the mediation or
arbitration of disputes between or among the beneficiaries, a fiduciary, a
person granted nonfiduciary powers under the trust instrument, or any
combination of such persons is enforceable.”90 The statute further states,
however, that any provision “requiring the mediation or arbitration of
disputes relating to the validity of a trust is not enforceable unless all
interested persons with regard to the dispute consent to the mediation or
arbitration of the dispute.”91 New Hampshire’s statute is similar. The
New Hampshire statute provides that “[i]f the terms of the trust require
the interested persons to resolve a trust dispute exclusively by reasonable
86. FLA. STAT. § 731.401(1).
87. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2015).
88. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 666 (concluding that “the Arizona provision does not
allow the arbitration of the validity of the trust instrument itself; that determination must be made
by the court, since the Arizona law only provides for the resolution of disputes ‘with regard to the
administration or distribution of the trust’” (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205)). But see
Horton, supra note 2, at 1076–77 (asserting that the Arizona statute applies to challenges to the
validity of an estate plan).
89. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.2-205 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-111A
(2015).
90. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.2-205(1).
91. Id. § 456.2-205(2).
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nonjudicial procedures, then those interested persons shall resolve that
trust dispute in accordance with the terms of the trust.”92 The statute
defines a “trust dispute,” however, to exclude “a determination of the
validity of the trust.”93
Thus, with respect to arbitration clauses in donative instruments
generally and testamentary arbitration clauses specifically, the limited
case law, academic commentary, and prominent proposed and enacted
statutory reforms all share a common limitation. None support the
enforcement of a donor-mandated arbitration provision in the case of a
challenge to the validity of the donative instrument.
With respect to testator-compelled arbitration, the root of this
limitation is the understanding that a will is not a contract. This mindset
informs the conclusion that neither the FAA nor state arbitration statutes
support enforcement of a testator-compelled arbitration clause respecting
a challenge to the validity of a will. This mindset also arguably has
cabined the ambitions of law reform efforts. Given the premise that the
donee has not contracted to arbitrate her claims against the will, the
conclusion may follow that it would be unfair to force the donee to
arbitrate such claims.
This Article turns next to an argument that challenges these dominant
understandings. This Article seeks to persuade judges that the courts have
sufficient authority under existing federal and state arbitration statutes to
enforce a testator-compelled arbitration provision even with respect to a
will contestant who does not seek to take under the will or who seeks
through his contest to redirect property to the intestate estate that
otherwise would pass under the will. At the same time, given the virtue
of certainty with respect to the enforceability of any arbitration provision,
this Article seeks also to convince legislators that, as a normative matter,
it is appropriate to enact legislation that will make more certain the right
of a testator to compel arbitration.
II. THE WILL AS AN IMPLIED UNILATERAL ARBITRATION CONTRACT
This Part strives to demonstrate that a will fits within existing contract
law as an implied-in-fact unilateral contract. An implied-in-fact contract,
like an express contract, requires an offer, acceptance of the offer, and
consideration supporting the contract.94 Unlike an express contract, an
implied contract may arise even though the parties have not expressly
agreed to the terms of the contract.95 A court discerns the terms of the
92.
93.
94.
2004).
95.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-111A(a).
Id. § 564-B:1-111A(d).
See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH

ON

CONTRACTS §§ 3.10, 3.14 (3d ed.

See id. § 3.14.
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implied contract from the parties’ communications and conduct.96
In traditional contract analysis, a contract may be either bilateral or
unilateral. A bilateral contract involves mutual promises to perform.97 A
unilateral contract, however, involves a promise that a party accepts by
performance, rather than by a promise to perform.98
As mentioned above, this Article argues that a will is an implied
unilateral contract between the testator and the state.99 The state offers to
pass the testator’s property at his death to his preferred donees. The
testator accepts this offer by creating and prudently managing his wealth.
At the time the testator executes his will, the terms of the will “form[] an
integrated whole with the [donative freedom] agreement.”100
This argument borrows heavily from the law governing the workplace
relationship between a firm and its worker. For example, consider the
retention bonus as an implied unilateral contract. Assume that in January
of a given year, an employer posts a notice proclaiming that it will pay a
10% bonus in December of that year to any present employee who
remains employed with the firm at that future date. Might this notice give
rise to contractual liability on the part of the employer?
Nearly a century ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court held on those
facts that the employer might be contractually liable. In Roberts v. Mays
Mills, Inc.,101 the court concluded that the firm’s announcement of its
intention to pay a retention bonus was “not a gift or gratuity.”102 Rather,
the announcement constituted an offer by the employer, which the
employee accepted by his “setting in to work until the end of the year.”103
The court further noted that the offer was not a selfless act on the part of
the employer. Rather, the court reasoned, the employer offered the
retention bonus “to procure efficient and faithful service and continuous
employment,”104 which might be a special concern during a time of labor
shortages.105 Courts have reached this same result—finding an implied
96. Id. § 3.10.
97. Id. §§ 2.3, 3.4.
98. Id.; see also Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985).
99. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
100. James Family Charitable Found. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 956 N.E.2d 243, 248
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (“State Street [, a custodian,] agreed to transfer assets in accordance with
instructions from James [, a donor,] in the future. . . . Once James gave such instructions
[identifying the donee], they supplemented the agreement and identified State Street’s obligations
with respect to the particular asset to be transferred. In other words, once received, the instructions
formed an integrated whole with the agreement.”).
101. 114 S.E. 530 (N.C. 1922).
102. Id. at 532.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 533 (quoting Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 137 N.W. 769, 772 (Wis. 1912)).
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unilateral contract—using similar reasoning in cases in which an
employer had promised to pay “dismissal wages” or severance pay if the
employer terminated an employee in a reduction in force.106
From the line of cases finding an implied unilateral contract in a
promise of retention or dismissal pay evolved a line of cases finding an
implied unilateral contract (often promising job security) in an employee
handbook.107 Typically, an employee handbook contains a company’s
personnel policies and procedures. The treatment of employee handbooks
as implied unilateral contracts between employers and employees
illustrates the concept at the heart of this Article’s argument: a will is an
implied unilateral contract.
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche108 is a seminal case holding that the
policies and procedures contained in an employment manual may give
rise to contractual liability.109 Richard Woolley sued Hoffman-La Roche
for breach of contract after Hoffman-La Roche terminated his
employment.110 Woolley did not have a written employment contract
with Hoffman-La Roche.111 Rather, he argued that “the express and
implied promises in [Hoffman-La Roche]’s employment manual created
a contract” that allowed the employer to terminate his employment only
for just cause and only after it followed the procedures outlined in the
employment manual.112 More specifically, Woolley argued that his
employer’s representations in its employment manual with respect to job
security constituted an offer that he accepted by continuing his
employment with the employer.113 Thus, when the employer terminated
106. See, e.g., Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 78 N.W.2d 296, 300, 302 (Mich. 1956)
(“[T]he adoption of the described [severance] policies by the company constituted an offer of a
contract. . . . ‘[T]he plaintiff accepted [this offer] . . . by continuing in its employment beyond the
5-year period specified . . . .’” (quoting the trial court’s decision)); Hercules Powder Co. v.
Brookfield, 53 S.E.2d 804, 808 (Va. 1949) (“Ample authority sustains the view that such a
promise amounts to an offer, which, if accepted by performance of the service, fulfills the legal
requirements of a contract.”).
107. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 893 (Mich. 1980)
(approving the reasoning from Cain); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257,
1267–68 (N.J. 1985) (approving the reasoning from Toussaint).
108. 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985).
109. Id. at 1258; see also J.H. Verkerke, The Story of Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche:
Finding a Way to Enforce Employee Handbook Promises, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 23, 24,
62 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007) (noting the “significant role” that Woolley
played in establishing the principle that a statement in an employment manual may form the basis
for an implied unilateral contract between employer and employee).
110. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1258.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Verkerke, supra note 109, at 41–42 (discussing the specifics of Woolley’s
complaint).
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his employment without just cause and without following specified
procedures, the employer breached an implied unilateral contract.114 The
New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with Woolley’s argument that the
termination clauses and procedures in the employer’s handbook could be
contractually binding.115
The court first concluded that the termination provisions in the manual
could constitute an offer by the employer.116 The court reasoned that the
context in which the employer distributed and maintained the manual
made it “almost inevitable” that an employee would believe that the
employer had agreed to undertake certain legally enforceable
obligations.117 Given the circumstances, the court concluded, the
employer could not avoid the contract merely by asserting that it did not
intend to be bound by the provisions in the employment manual: “Our
courts will not allow an employer to offer attractive inducements and
benefits to the workforce and then withdraw them when it chooses, no
matter how sincere its belief that they are not enforceable.”118
Second, the court concluded that the employee’s job performance
could serve as both acceptance of and consideration for the unilateral
contract, thereby making the employer’s promises concerning job
security a binding commitment.119 Indeed, the court held that in certain
circumstances an employment manual’s job security provisions become
binding at the time the employer distributes the manual, and the court
suggested in dictum that this might be so even if the employee is not
aware of the manual’s existence.120 In support of its holding, the New
Jersey Supreme Court approvingly quoted at length the Michigan
Supreme Court’s dictum in an earlier influential case—Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan121—discussing the effect of an
employer’s distribution of an employment manual and why an employee
114. See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1258; Verkerke, supra note 109, at 41–42.
115. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1258, 1264 (“[A]bsent a clear and prominent disclaimer, an
implied promise contained in an employment manual that an employee will be fired only for cause
may be enforceable against an employer even when the employment is for an indefinite term and
would otherwise be terminable at will.”).
116. Id. at 1265.
117. Id. at 1265–66 (“Having been employed, like hundreds of his co-employees, without
any individual employment contract, by an employer whose good reputation made it so attractive,
the employee is given this one document that purports to set forth the terms and conditions of his
employment, a document obviously carefully prepared by the company with all of the appearances
of corporate legitimacy that one could imagine.”).
118. Id. at 1266.
119. Id. at 1266–67 (concluding that “the manual is an offer that seeks the formation of a
unilateral contract—the employees’ bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding being
their continued work when they have no obligation to continue”).
120. See id. at 1268 n.10.
121. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
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should not be required to prove actual reliance on the handbook provision
that the employee seeks to enforce:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or
practices, where an employer chooses to establish such
policies and practices and makes them known to its
employees, the employment relationship is presumably
enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and
loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind
associated with job security and the conviction that he will
be treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations need take
place and the parties’ minds need not meet on the subject;
nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of the
particulars of the employer’s policies and practices or that
the employer may change them unilaterally. It is enough that
the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to
create an environment in which the employee believes that,
whatever[] the personnel policies and practices, they are
established and official at any given time, purport to be fair,
and are applied consistently and uniformly to each
employee. The employer has then created a situation
“instinct with an obligation.”122
Thus, under Toussaint and Woolley, an employer that promulgates an
employment policy for the purpose of improving employee performance
and morale may not later argue that its promise is illusory.123
122. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (quoting Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892). In Toussaint, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that an employee’s claim of wrongful discharge might properly be
based upon the employee’s “legitimate expectations grounded in his employer’s written policy
statements set forth in the manual of personnel policies.” 292 N.W.2d at 885. The court further
held that such policy statements “can give rise to contractual rights in employees without evidence
that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would create contractual rights in the
employee.” Id. at 892.
The Toussaint court borrowed the phrase “instinct with an obligation” from Judge Benjamin
Cardozo. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E.
214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)). Judge Cardozo borrowed the phrase from another jurist. See Wood, 118
N.E. at 214 (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)).
123. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 895 (“Having announced the policy, presumably with a
view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality
of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory.”); Woolley, 491 A.2d at
1271 (“It would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the
workforce believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to renege
on those promises.”); see also Hunter v. Bd. of Trs. of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510,
513, 515 (Iowa 1992) (asserting that “[i]n exchange for the employer’s guarantee not to discharge
in the absence of cause or certain specified conditions, the employer reaps the benefits of a more
secure and presumably more productive work force” and holding that representations of job
security in an employment manual may give rise to contractual liability); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087–88 (Wash. 1984) (concluding “that the principal, though not
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Following Woolley, the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions have firmly
established the principle that statements in employer-promulgated
handbooks may serve as the basis for contractual protection.124 As one
commentator put it, Woolley “has become part of the fabric of
contemporary employment law. The proposition for which it stands is
now utterly unremarkable. This legal principle is so widely accepted that
we note today only the few isolated jurisdictions that still refuse to
enforce employee handbook promises.”125 Many of the jurisdictions that
have enforced employee handbook promises have justified the decision
using an implied unilateral contract theory.126 Pursuant to implied
unilateral contract theory in its broadest form: (1) the employment
manual promise does not have to be explicit; it can be implied;127 (2) the

exclusive, reason employers issue such manuals is to create an atmosphere of fair treatment and
job security for their employees” and holding that an employer’s creation of such an atmosphere
may give rise to “an obligation of treatment in accord with [its] written promises”).
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 Reporters’ Notes cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2014) (adopting “the position of the clear majority of U.S. jurisdictions (39 of 51, as of the
May 2014 approval of this Restatement) that unilateral employer policy statements can, in
appropriate circumstances, establish binding employer obligations”); Verkerke, supra note 109,
at 23; Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 326, 328 (1992); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the
Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313,
344 (2007) (noting that “[f]orty-two jurisdictions allow employee rights arising from implied-infact contracts” and that “[t]he implied contract exception [to at-will employment] most often
arises in the context of employee handbooks”); see also, e.g., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731
P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 317
(Ill. 1987) (stating that “the overwhelming majority of courts considering the issue have held that
an employee handbook may, under proper circumstances, be contractually binding” and citing
more than two dozen cases in support of this assertion); Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 515–16; Libby v.
Calais Reg’l Hosp., 554 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Me. 1989).
125. Verkerke, supra note 109, at 62.
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 Reporters’ Notes cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2014) (citing case law from sixteen jurisdictions “us[ing] some form of unilateral-contract
analysis” to enforce employer promises contained in employee handbooks); see Befort, supra note
124, at 340–42; see also, e.g., Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711 & n.1 (noting the use of unilateral contracts
in termination procedures); Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 513 (illustrating that use of an employer’s
handbook may constitute a unilateral contract); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (describing when an employer’s handbook becomes a unilateral contract).
To be more precise, although in some cases both the employer’s offer and the employee’s
acceptance are implied, more typically the employer’s offer is express and only the employee’s
acceptance is implied. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 3.14a (making this point generally
with respect to implied-in-fact employment contracts).
127. See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Mich. Nat’l Bank-W., 716 F.2d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 1983)
(construing Michigan Supreme Court precedent as holding that employer policies and practices
can give rise to an implied contractual right to just-cause employment and citing lower Michigan
court cases consistent with the holding).
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employee’s continued work constitutes her acceptance of the contract;128
(3) the employee’s continued work constitutes her consideration given
for the contract;129 and (4) pursuant to a presumed enhancement theory,
courts utilize a presumed acceptance fiction and a presumed
consideration fiction—the employee need not even know about the
contract; all that is necessary is that the employer has created a work
environment that is “instinct with an obligation.”130
The implied unilateral contract theory that courts have applied to find
a contractual relationship in the context of employee handbooks can be
applied with similar effect in the context of a state probate code governing
the passing of property at death. In the latter context, the state has created
an environment that is instinct with an obligation.131 Central to this
argument is an understanding of why donative freedom is the keystone of
American inheritance law. This understanding sheds light not only on the
state’s motive in offering to respect donative intent but also on the
donor’s means of accepting and providing consideration for the donative
freedom contract.
A long-understood and widely accepted rationale for freedom of
testation is that donative freedom is an incentive to industry and saving.132
128. See, e.g., Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711; Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318; Hunter, 481 N.W.2d
at 513; Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627.
129. See, e.g., Sisco v. GSA Nat’l Capital Fed. Credit Union, 689 A.2d 52, 56–57 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711; Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318; Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 513–14;
Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627; see also 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 2.10
(discussing consideration in at-will employment).
130. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 2.10a; see also Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac.
Airlines, Ltd., 724 P.2d 110, 117–18 (Haw. 1986) (holding that the employer’s rules “constitute
a contract enforceable by the employees” and reasoning that “[i]nasmuch as [the employer]
circulated the rules with an intention ‘to create expectations and induce reliance by employees as
a group[,]’ it ‘should not be able to escape liability on the grounds that a particular employee was
unaware of the [rules] and thus did not receive a promise’” (quoting Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern
Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 583 (1983) (last two alterations in original)); Woolley
v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1268 & n.10 (N.J. 1985) (describing when an
employer has created a situation instinct with an obligation); Taylor v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 652
A.2d 466, 471 (Vt. 1993) (holding “that personnel manual provisions inconsistent with an at-will
relationship may be used as evidence that the contract of employment requires good cause for
termination despite the fact that the manual was not part of the initial employment agreement,”
recognizing “that this holding draws on aspects of both unilateral contract formation and
promissory estoppel,” and expressly agreeing with the rationale of Toussaint).
131. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 N.Y. (1917).
132. See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 34 (listing “a plan of forced inheritance might
discourage individual initiative and thrift” as one of the “grave disadvantages to a rule which
would forbid an owner any freedom of determining where his property shall go upon his death”);
Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY, supra note 19, at 3, 4 (noting that some have argued that freedom of testation is “an
encouragement to industry and thrift”).
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The state grants to each citizen the right to control the disposition of his
property at death “as an incentive to bring forth creativity, hard work,
initiative and ultimately productivity that benefits others.”133 This
freedom of disposition serves also as an inducement “to save rather than
to consume, and to go on saving long after [one’s] own lifelong future
needs are provided for.”134 Individuals’ savings are thought to be
critically important to the health of the overall economy.135
Professors Adam J. Hirsch and William K.S. Wang have described the
industry and thrift justification for testamentary freedom:
One argument, tracing back to the thirteenth century jurist
Henry de Bracton, if not earlier, holds that freedom of
testation creates an incentive to industry and saving.
Bracton’s assumption—shared by modern social
scientists—was that persons derive satisfaction out of
bequeathing property to others. To the extent that lawmakers
deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the
subjective value of property will drop, for one of its potential
uses will have disappeared. As a result, thwarted testators
will choose to accumulate less property, and the total stock
of wealth existing at any given time will shrink.
Testamentary freedom accordingly fulfills the normative
goal of wealth maximization, which is advanced by its
proponents as the best available barometer of utility
maximization.136
Thus, a principal reason why the state offers in its probate code to
distribute a future decedent’s property in accordance with the property
owner’s expressed or implied wishes is quite similar to a principal reason
why an employer offers in an employee handbook to provide a measure
of job security to its worker. In both cases, the offeror hopes to induce a
more productive workforce. Moreover, the property owner accepts and
provides consideration for the donative freedom contract in a manner
similar to that by which an employee accepts the unilateral contract for
job security in an employee handbook. In both cases, the offeree’s
performance in the form of hard work constitutes her acceptance of the
contract and her consideration given for the contract. More precisely, the
property owner accepts the state’s offer to honor his donative intent and
provides consideration for the donative freedom contract by being
133. Halbach, supra note 131, at 5.
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id. (explaining that “savings of individuals are vital to the economy’s capital base and
thus to its level of employment and to the productivity of other individuals”).
136. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND.
L.J. 1, 7–8 (1992) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 16 (discussing the productivity-incentive
theory of testamentary freedom as applied to the right to bequeath future interests).
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economically productive and by saving and investing his estate rather
than consuming it.
Under the broad reasoning of Woolley and its progeny, it is of no
moment to the implied unilateral contract analysis that a particular
testator or indeed the citizenry in general is ignorant of the specifics of
the probate code. It is sufficient that the citizenry has a general sense that
the government respects the right of each person to do as she pleases with
her property at death. The American citizenry certainly does have this
sense.137 The right to pass property at death by will is so much a part of
the American culture that any alternative seems unthinkable.138 Professor
Ray D. Madoff has observed with respect to this point:
If you ask an American about the legal rights of dead
people, you will probably get an answer having to do with
[living] people’s rights to control who gets their property
after they die. This right to control the disposition of
property at death is central to the American psyche.
Although people are often vague in their understanding
about many aspects of the law, one thing they do know is
that they can write a will that controls who will—and who
will not—get their property after they die.139
Given that the state has chosen to establish a right to pass one’s
property at death and has made this right known to the citizenry, the
productivity of the state’s citizens “is presumably enhanced.”140 The state
secures a productive citizenry, and the productive citizen enjoys the peace
of mind that comes from knowing that the state will respect her donative
wishes at her death. To paraphrase the Michigan Supreme Court in
Toussaint, “No [ante-mortem] negotiations need take place and the
parties’ minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it matter that the
[donor] knows nothing of the particulars of the [probate code] or that the
[state] may change them unilaterally.”141 All that is required is that the
state has chosen “to create an environment in which the [donor] believes
137. See, e.g., MADOFF, supra note 21, at 57–58 (asserting that most Americans view the
right to control the passing of their property at their death “as essential to the very notion of private
property”).
138. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 19, at 19 (noting American familiarity with wills and
adding that “[t]he law of inheritance has its technical side; but its basic institutions (the will, for
example) are widely known, and accepted as part of the machinery of life”); MADOFF, supra note
21, at 57 (commenting on how the American arts frequently explore the theme of one’s ability to
control the disposition of one’s property at death and the related theme of how this right enables
one to exert control over others during one’s life).
139. MADOFF, supra note 21, at 57.
140. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich.
1980).
141. See id. (footnote omitted).
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that, whatever the [probate code specifics], they are established and
official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently
and uniformly to each [donor]. The [state] has then created a situation
‘instinct with an obligation.’”142
To be sure, courts and commentators have raised serious objections to
Woolley and its progeny.143 The principal criticism centers on the
understanding that traditional unilateral contract doctrine requires that the
offeror communicate an offer to the offeree and that the offeree
commence his performance in exchange for the offered terms.144 That is,
in the traditional case of a unilateral contract, the offeror must seek the
offeree’s performance in exchange for the offeror’s promise, and the
offeree must give his performance in exchange for that promise.145
Certainly then, under traditional contract doctrine, no contract exists
when the offeree performs without knowledge of the offer.146
Under Woolley and its progeny, however, a court implies the offer,
acceptance, and consideration elements rather than require an intent of
the parties147: In most cases of employee handbooks, the employer does
not intend to make an offer by circulating its employment manual, and
the employee does not mean for her continued employment to serve as
acceptance of an offer or consideration for the promise.148 Thus, the
Woolley doctrine employs legal fictions pursuant to which the court
presumes an offer, acceptance, and consideration.149
In defense of Woolley, courts make use of those legal fictions in light
142. See id. (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)).
143. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015)
(calling application of unilateral contract theory in the case of employee handbooks “a
conceptually awkward fit,” noting that employees rarely are aware of the terms of employerissued statements, asserting that “traditional principles of consideration and bargained-for
exchange rarely, if ever, apply when the employer’s unilateral statements are not made in response
to a prospective employee’s expressed concerns or an employee’s threat to resign,” and resting its
endorsement of enforcement of employee handbook promises on “general estoppel principles”
rather than unilateral contract theory).
144. See id.
145. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 3.4.
146. See, e.g., Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 99 S.W. 1111, 1111–12 (Tex. 1907) (holding that no
contract to pay a reward existed where the citizen who captured and returned an escaped prisoner
did so without knowledge of the offer of a reward).
147. See Verkerke, supra note 109, at 55; Befort, supra note 124, at 341–43.
148. See Befort, supra note 124, at 343; see also 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 2.10
(noting that in employee handbook cases, “there is rarely any evidence that the promise played
any role in the employee not quitting” and concluding that “[t]hese cases represent a significant
erosion of the requirement of bargain”).
149. See Verkerke, supra note 109, at 55; Befort, supra note 124, at 341 (explaining how the
court in Pine River State Bank implied the offer, acceptance, and communication).
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of the practical realities that: (1) employers distribute employment
manuals to their employees in part to enhance the employment
relationship; and (2) employee handbooks further this goal in part
because employers encourage workers to rely on the promissory
statements set forth in these handbooks.150 Therefore, implying a
unilateral contract prevents the unjust enrichment of the employer who
secures a motivated and compliant workforce by inducing worker
reliance on its promissory statements.151
Moreover, the criticism of the law’s reliance on legal fictions to
supply an offer, acceptance, and consideration in the context of a job
security provision in an employee handbook arguably has much less force
in the context of the donative freedom contract. In contrast to the typical
employer, which ordinarily does not intend to make an offer of job
security when it issues an employee handbook,152 the state does intend
and expect to be bound by the offer in its probate code to pass a property
owner’s estate at his death to his preferred donees. Also, given that a
principal justification for the respect that the state shows for donative
freedom is the belief that such donative freedom serves as an incentive
for industry and thrift,153 the state more realistically should be understood
as seeking the property owner’s performance in exchange for the state’s
promise to respect donative freedom.
Further, compared to the typical employee, who ordinarily does not
intend by her continued employment to accept or provide consideration
for the employer’s “offer” of job security contained in an employee
handbook, it seems more realistic to impute to the typical property
owner—especially one who executes a will—an intent to accept the
state’s offer by being economically productive and by saving and
investing her estate rather than consuming her estate. As discussed above,
the typical citizen is likely to appreciate that she is free to dispose of her
property at her death as she sees fit.154 The citizen who executes a will
evidences this understanding by the very act of executing the will. Again,
given the understanding that donative freedom is an incentive to industry
and saving, the property owner more realistically should be understood
150. See Befort, supra note 124, at 337–39.
151. See id. at 339, 343, 370; see also Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract,
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 199, 207–08 (2005) (arguing for the enforcement of workplace
norms pursuant to relational contract theory, citing to the Toussaint court’s use of implied contract
doctrine as an example of a court applying relational principles in the employment context, and
explaining that “an employer commits relational opportunism when it encourages employee
loyalty through implied promises of job security and fair treatment and then retracts that security
and fair treatment when they prove inconvenient”).
152. Befort, supra note 124, at 343.
153. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
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as truly giving her performance in exchange for the state’s promise to
respect her wishes for the disposition of her property at death. Moreover,
the fact that the property owner has multiple motivations for acquiring
and preserving her assets does not prevent the performance from serving
as consideration for the state’s donative freedom promise.155 Thus, the
case for applying the Woolley framework is much stronger in the context
of inheritance than it is in the employee handbook context in which courts
have widely accepted it.156

155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“The fact
that a promise does not of itself induce a performance or return promise does not prevent the
performance or return promise from being consideration for the promise.”). What of the property
owner who shows industry and thrift, but is not motivated whatsoever by the state’s offer of
donative freedom? Alternatively, what of the spendthrift sloth who does her best to waste all that
she has received and to avoid any productive activity? Such property owners would be similarly
situated to most employees under the broad reading of Woolley and its progeny in that they do not
truly mean for their actions to constitute acceptance of or consideration for the implied unilateral
contract. Thus, under Woolley and its progeny, the court will imply such property owners’
acceptance and consideration. Cf. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 3.14a (“Although such
holdings are a radical departure from traditional contract law, they produce the salutary result that
all employees—those who read the handbook and those who did not—are treated alike.”). The
spendthrift sloth who manages to dissipate her entire fortune would be treated like an employee
who is offered job security but quits her employment.
156. Applying unilateral contract theory in the inheritance law context should not preclude
the state from modifying its probate code from time to time. Again, the law of employee
handbooks is instructive. A substantial number of jurisdictions have held that an employer may
prospectively modify a binding policy statement by providing affected employees with reasonable
advance notice of the modification. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 Reporters’
Notes cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (endorsing the position that “[a]bsent circumstances giving
rise to nonmodifiable . . . or accrued employee rights, . . . [where] employer obligations are
predicated solely on prior unilateral statements[, such obligations] can be modified or rescinded
prospectively by the same mechanism that created them—unilateral employer promulgation with
reasonable advance notice given to affected employees” and citing numerous cases in support);
see also Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 76, 81 (Cal. 2000) (holding that “[a]n employer may
terminate a written employment security policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition
is one of indefinite duration and the employer makes the change after a reasonable time, on
reasonable notice, and without interfering with the employees’ vested benefits” and noting that
“the majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed the question” have reached a similar
conclusion).
Moreover, the fact that the property owner may alter the specific terms of the donative
freedom contract from time to time—by execution, revocation, or amendment of his will or
codicil—does not preclude contract formation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 34(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“The terms of a contract may be reasonably certain even though
it empowers one or both parties to make a selection of terms in the course of performance.”); id.
§ 34 cmt. a (“A bargain may be concluded which leaves a choice of terms to be made by one party
or the other. If the agreement is otherwise sufficiently definite to be a contract, it is not made
invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of performance to be specified by one of the parties.”).
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III. THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE DONEE’S LACK OF
CONSENT TO ARBITRATE
Even if one accepts that a will is a contract within the purview of the
FAA and state arbitration statutes, one might still object to testatorcompelled arbitration given that a will contestant is not a party to that
contract. The implied unilateral contract that contains the express
arbitration clause—the will—is between the testator and the state. Neither
the testator’s legatee or devisee under the will nor his heir pursuant to the
intestacy statutes is a party to the donative freedom contract entered into
between the donor and the state.157 Neither has consented, therefore, to
the will’s arbitration clause. Given arbitration dogma that “arbitration is
a creature of contract”158 and the reality that neither the will beneficiary
nor the heir has contracted to arbitrate her will contest, the argument must
be addressed that it would be inappropriate therefore to compel either the
will beneficiary or the heir to arbitrate her challenge to the testator’s will.
One virtue of conceptualizing a will as a contract between the testator
and the state is that doing so brings into sharp relief the true nature of the
will beneficiary and the heir with respect to the arbitration clause in that
contract.159 These donees are bystanders to the contracting process. They
are third-party beneficiaries of the donative freedom contract between the
property owner and the state. Appreciating this true nature of the donee
allows for a better understanding of the arguments that compelling a
donee to arbitrate his will contest when he has not agreed to arbitrate is
consistent with both the law of wills and the law of arbitration.
As for the law of wills, it is well-established in the law of donative
transfers that the rights of the donee are derivative of and subordinate to
the rights of the testator.160 The testator’s right to disinherit his children
157. Cf. Martz’s Ex’r v. Martz’s Heirs, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 361, 365 (1874) (“The legatees are
parties interested in the will, but they are in no sense parties to the making of it.”).
158. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1960) (“[S]ince
arbitration is a creature of contract, a court must always inquire, when a party seeks to invoke its
aid to force a reluctant party to the arbitration table, whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate
the particular dispute.”); see also Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010)
(“The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”); AT&T
Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (noting that arbitration is a
matter of contract).
159. Cf. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1174 (“Although theory can
often seem entirely divorced from the practice of law, this [issue of mandatory trust arbitration]
is one instance where the manner in which a device [(the trust)] is conceptualized can make a
difference in how it is treated in court.”).
160. See In re Morgan’s Estate, 72 A. 498, 499 (Pa. 1909) (discussing the justification for
enforcement of a trust spendthrift provision and commenting that “[i]t is always to be remembered
that consideration for the beneficiary does not even in the remotest way enter into the policy of
the law. It has regard solely to the rights of the donor.”); Spitko, Protecting the Abhorrent
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serves as the most powerful example of this principle. As Professor
Edward C. Halbach Jr. has stated, “inheritance may grant wealth to
donees without regard to their competence and performance, but the
economic reasons for allowing inheritance are viewed in terms of proper
rewards and socially valuable incentives to the donor.”161 In the context
of testator-compelled arbitration, this first principle speaks to the
unfairness argument—it would be unfair to force the will beneficiary to
arbitrate her will contest when the beneficiary has not consented to the
arbitral forum. There can be no unfairness or unconscionability arising
from a donor conditioning his gift on the donee’s consent to arbitrate any
dispute relating to the gift.162
Indeed, American inheritance law guarantees the testator tremendous
latitude in attaching conditions to her donative transfer.163 The sole
limitation is that the condition must not violate public policy.164 In
general, courts have applied this limitation sparingly.165 Courts have
noted frequently in upholding conditions on testamentary gifts that “since
the heirs could have been disinherited entirely, they cannot complain
about having conditions imposed on their bequests.”166
Thus, it is fully in accord with the law of donative transfers that the
Testator, supra note 6, at 300 (arguing that “the heir’s or putative legatee’s ‘rights’ in the
decedent’s property are wholly derivative of the decedent’s right to pass her property to the
persons of her choosing at her death”); cf. Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So. 2d 2, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (explaining with respect to a claim of tortious interference with an expectancy that the “the
beneficiary is authorized to sue to recover damages primarily to protect the testator’s interest
rather than the disappointed beneficiary’s expectations”).
161. Halbach, supra note 132, at 6.
162. See Langbein, supra note 32, at 651 n.136 (“Because the trust deal originates in a gift,
a unilateral transfer, the concerns about information cost and market failure that motivate
unconscionability limits on party autonomy for exchange transactions in contract law have less
sway in trusts.”); Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1241 (“Since there can
be no inequality of bargaining power in a donative relationship, trust arbitration cannot be
problematic in this sense.”).
163. See Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 826, 832 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974)
(holding that public policy does not preclude a testator from conditioning his gift on the donee
marrying, within seven years of the testator’s death, a Jewish woman whose parents are both
Jewish); see also MADOFF, supra note 21, at 6 (“Americans [in passing property at death] are
largely free to impose whatever conditions they want, and their plans can often be imposed for as
long as they want, even in perpetuity.”). See generally id. at 72–76 (discussing conditional
bequests and noting that “American law has been very liberal in terms of allowing individuals
posthumous control over the behavior of others through the use of conditional trusts”).
164. MADOFF, supra note 21, at 73.
165. Id. (“[C]ourts have generally been loath to use their authority to restrict these conditions,
seeing it as outside their bailiwick.”).
166. Id.
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testator may condition his gift on the donee acceding to his direction that
disputes relating to the gift be resolved by arbitration.167 Indeed, several
courts in the nineteenth century expressly relied upon conditional gift
theory in upholding the right of a testator to appoint an arbitrator to
interpret the testator’s will and to resolve disputes arising under the
will.168 For example, in 1886, the Supreme Court of West Virginia spoke
at length on the relationship between testamentary freedom and testatorcompelled arbitration:
Of course a will is not an agreement between two or more
contracting parties, but it is certainly no less binding upon
the parties who take a benefit under it than if they had
contracted with the testator for that benefit. The testator has
full dominion over his property with the absolute right,
subject only to the limitations fixed by law, to do with and
dispose of it in any manner or to whomever his will or
caprice may suggest. Within the rules of law he may subject
it to any limitation, restriction or condition he chooses, and
the devisee or legatee, if he elects to take under the will, will
be bound to respect and observe the same. It, therefore,
seems to me entirely clear that a testator has the power not
only to appoint a person or arbitrator to interpret and settle
difficulties among the devisees and legatees growing out of
the dispositions made by the will, but that he has the right to
make the decision of such arbiter, if made without fraud or
corruption, final and conclusive upon the beneficiaries under
the will.169
As for the law of arbitration, settled arbitration doctrine provides that
a court may compel a non-signatory to a contract containing an arbitration

167. Cf. Janin, supra note 6, at 525 (“The distinguishing characteristic of such [arbitration]
provisions is that the interests given by the testator or settlor are conditioned by the terms of his
will or conveyance. Those who wish to take under the instrument are obliged to submit all disputes
thereafter arising to arbitration.”).
168. See, e.g., Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 9, 11–12 (Conn. 1873) (“It is familiar law that
a testator may confer on executors and on others absolute power of appointment and disposition
over his property. So he may annex conditions and qualifications to his bequests not repugnant to
law and good policy.”); In re Phillips’s Estate, 10 Pa. C. 374, 380 (Orphans’ Ct. 1891) (holding
that if a testator may designate a third person as an executor, a testator should also have the power
to designate a third person to address questions of distribution or construction that arise out of his
will); Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, 374 (1886) (noting that with a testator’s right to implement
restrictions and conditions into his will also comes the right to appoint an arbitrator to interpret
that will).
169. Moore, 27 W. Va. at 374 (emphasis added).
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clause to arbitrate his claim arising from the contract.170 Indeed, courts
may use at least six theories to compel a non-signatory to a contract
containing an arbitration clause to bring any claims under the contract in
arbitration: (1) agency; (2) alter ego or veil-piercing; (3) assumption; (4)
incorporation by reference; (5) third-party beneficiary; and (6) equitable
estoppel.171 Of these, only third-party beneficiary and equitable estoppel
are relevant to a discussion of testator-compelled arbitration.
The principal concern in arbitration law with binding a non-signatory
to an arbitration contract is not that the nonparty has not signed the
contract. Although the FAA, UAA, and RUAA require a written contract
or agreement before they apply to an arbitration provision, they do not
require that the entity against whom it will be enforced sign the writing.172
Moreover, an enforceable written arbitration contract can arise from an
implied unilateral contract.173 Thus, an arbitration contract may be
“written” even though the offeree’s acceptance is implied.174 For
example, an employee can accept an arbitration contract offered by her
employer in a written employee handbook by continuing her
employment.175
170. See, e.g., Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 2003);
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Weekley
Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 129, 131 (Tex. 2005).
171. Bridas, 345 F.3d at 356–63 (listing the six theories and discussing agency, alter ego,
estoppel, and third-party beneficiary); Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 777–80 (discussing
incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, alter ego, and estoppel); Rachal v. Reitz, 403
S.W.3d 840, 846 n.5 (Tex. 2013).
172. See, e.g., Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Although § 3 of
the FAA requires arbitration agreements to be written, it does not require them to be signed.”);
Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 63–64 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming that the FAA
requires a written arbitration agreement but does not require that the parties sign the written
agreement); Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 851 (noting that the Texas Arbitration Act requires an
arbitration provision to be in writing but holding that a court may compel a non-signatory to the
written arbitration provision to arbitrate her claim arising under the written instrument); Hurley
v. Fox, 520 So. 2d 467, 467, 469 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that Louisiana’s statute on the
validity of arbitration agreements requires an arbitration contract to be in writing but does not
require that the parties sign the contract).
173. See, e.g., Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2007);
Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 926 (7th
Cir. 2002).
174. See, e.g., Seawright, 507 F.3d at 978; Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d
1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 2005).
175. See, e.g., Seawright, 507 F.3d at 970 (holding that an employee’s “knowing
continuation of employment after the effective date of the arbitration program constituted
acceptance of a valid and enforceable contract to arbitrate”); Caley, 428 F.3d at 1369, 1374;
Tinder, 305 F.3d at 731, 734 (concluding that an arbitration contract arose from a brochure that
the employer stuffed into the envelope containing the employee’s paycheck and holding that an
employee’s continued employment may provide both the employee’s acceptance of the arbitration
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Rather, the more serious concern with binding a non-signatory to an
arbitration contract is that the non-signatory has not consented to the
contract. As the Supreme Court suggested in Arthur Andersen LLP v.
Carlisle,176 however, pursuant to the FAA a court may compel a nonparty
to an arbitration contract to arbitrate in accordance with the arbitration
contract where state contract principles allow a court to enforce the
contract against the nonparty.177 In Carlisle, the Court considered
whether a litigant who was not a party to the written arbitration contract
that other litigants in the case had entered into might be entitled under
Section 3 of the FAA to a stay of the litigation pending arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration contract.178 The Court first noted that, in
general, state contract law determines which arbitration agreements are
binding under Section 2 of the FAA and enforceable under Section 3 of
the FAA, and against whom the agreements are enforceable, provided
that the state contract law “arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”179 The Court
further noted that “‘traditional principles’ of state law allow a contract to
be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through ‘assumption,
piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, thirdparty beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel’”180 Thus, the Court held
that “a litigant who was not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement
may invoke § 3 if the relevant state contract law allows him to enforce
the agreement.”181
Although Carlisle involved a nonparty to an arbitration contract
seeking to enforce the contract against parties to the agreement, courts
may apply Carlisle’s reasoning generally to cases in which a party to an
arbitration contract seeks to compel arbitration against a nonparty to the
arbitration contract: under Section 2 of the FAA, state law determines
contract and the employer’s consideration for the arbitration contract); Brown v. St. Paul Travelers
Cos., 559 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569
(Tex. 2002).
176. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009).
177. See id. at 632.
178. Id. at 629.
179. Id. at 630–31 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987)).
180. Id. at 631 (quoting 21 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:19 (4th ed. 2001)).
181. Id. at 632; see also id. at 631 n.6 (“There is no doubt that, where state law permits it, a
third-party claim is ‘referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing.’” (quoting 9 U.S.C.
§ 3 (2012)); Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Under
principles of estoppel, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to that
agreement to arbitrate a dispute” when there exists “a relationship among the parties of a nature
that justifies a conclusion that the party which agreed to arbitrate with another entity should be
estopped from denying an obligation to arbitrate a similar dispute with the adversary which is not
a party to the arbitration agreement” (quoting Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 542 F.3d
354, 359 (2d. Cir. 2008)).
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whether an arbitration contract may “be enforced by or against nonparties
to the contract.”182 Thus, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that Carlisle was controlling in a case—Todd v.
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Ass’n183—in which a party to an
arbitration contract sought to stay litigation involving a nonparty to the
arbitration contract and to compel that nonparty to arbitrate his claims
against the party pursuant to the arbitration agreement.184
In Todd, Anthony Todd filed a suit against Steamship in Louisiana
state court to collect on his judgment against his now-insolvent employer
for injuries he suffered on the job.185 At the time of Todd’s injury,
Steamship insured Todd’s employer against liability the employer might
incur because of injuries to its employees.186 Steamship’s insurance
contract with Todd’s employer contained a clause requiring the employer
to arbitrate its disputes with Steamship.187 After Steamship removed the
case to federal court, Steamship sought to stay the litigation and compel
arbitration.188
Steamship argued that the court should compel Todd to arbitrate his
claims against Steamship because those claims derived from the
employer’s contract with Steamship, which contained an arbitration
clause.189 In addressing this argument, the Fifth Circuit recognized that
Carlisle effectively overruled Fifth Circuit precedent that had reasoned
that “[t]he FAA does not require arbitration unless the parties to a dispute
have agreed to refer it to arbitration. . . . [and] the mandatory stay
provision of the FAA does not apply to those who are not contractually
bound by the arbitration agreement.”190 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for a determination as to whether
182. See Carlisle, 556 U.S. at 631 (“If a written arbitration provision is made enforceable
against (or for the benefit of) a third party under state contract law, the [FAA]’s terms are
fulfilled.”).
183. 601 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2010).
184. Id. at 331.
185. Id. at 330–31.
186. Id. at 331.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. Steamship brought its motions to stay litigation and compel arbitration pursuant to
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly
referred to as the New York Convention. Id. The New York Convention implementing legislation
incorporates the FAA to the extent that the FAA does not conflict with the Convention. Id. at 331–
32. The Todd court concluded, “Carlisle and other cases discussing whether nonsignatories can
be compelled to arbitrate under the FAA are relevant for this case governed by the New York
Convention.” Id. at 334–35.
190. Id. at 333 (quoting Zimmerman v. Int’l Cos. & Consulting, Inc., 107 F.3d 344, 346 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
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the court could compel Todd to arbitrate as a non-signatory under
applicable law.191
Thus, if one accepts that a will is a contract, under the reasoning in
Carlisle, the FAA will provide for enforcement of testator-compelled
arbitration so long as state contract law would bind the will contestant to
the will’s arbitration clause. As asserted above, courts may utilize both
third-party beneficiary theory and equitable estoppel theory to make the
will’s arbitration clause binding on the will contestant.192 The two
theories are similar but distinct. For example, the third-party beneficiary
doctrine focuses on the intentions of the contracting parties at the time of
the contract’s execution, while the equitable estoppel doctrine focuses on
post-contracting conduct.193
To demonstrate that a nonparty to a contract is a third-party
beneficiary of the contract, it is not sufficient to show merely that the
nonparty would benefit incidentally from enforcement of the contract.
Rather, it must be shown that a party to the contract—or in some
jurisdictions, both parties to the contract—intended that the nonparty
benefit from the contract and that performance of the contract would
complete a gift intended for the nonparty or would satisfy a debt owed to
the nonparty.194 Courts will bind a third-party beneficiary to a contract’s
arbitration clause when the claim that the third-party beneficiary seeks to
assert arises from the contract that contains the arbitration clause and for
which the third party was the intended beneficiary.195 These principles
support an argument that the beneficiary of a will and the intestate heir
should be considered third-party beneficiaries of the donative freedom
contract, of which the will is a part, and should be bound to arbitrate any
contest arising under the donative freedom contract that contains an
arbitration clause.
It is undeniable that the testator executes her will for the purpose of
benefitting her will beneficiary and that performance of the will contract
would complete a gift intended for the beneficiary.196 The cases in which

191. Id. at 332.
192. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
193. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 362 (5th Cir. 2003); E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 200 n.7
(3d Cir. 2001).
194. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, § 10.3. In some jurisdictions, one must also show that
the contracting parties’ intent to benefit the third party was a material purpose of the parties in
entering into the contract. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 196.
195. E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 195.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. c, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(stating that a “donee beneficiary” is an intended beneficiary under Section 302(1)(b) and
illustrating the point with a will substitute example: “A, an insurance company, promises B in a
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an intended will beneficiary brings suit against the testator’s attorney for
malpractice in the drafting or execution of the will speak to these points.
Numerous courts have held that an intended will beneficiary whose
testamentary gift is lost due to the negligence of the testator’s attorney
may bring a contract claim against the attorney as a third-party
beneficiary of the contract between the testator and the attorney.197
The more complicated argument is that a will contestant who
challenges a will containing an arbitration clause necessarily seeks to
assert a claim arising from the contract. The argument derives from an
understanding that the will is but one part of a greater donative freedom
contract, which also contains a provision providing for the intestate
passing of a decedent’s property where the decedent failed during his life
to execute an effective estate plan. This argument also applies to a direct
benefits estoppel analysis; therefore, this Article develops this argument
directly below in connection with a discussion of direct benefits estoppel.
policy of insurance to pay $10,000 on B’s death to C, B’s wife. C is an intended beneficiary under
Subsection (1)(b)”).
197. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, §§ 10.1, 10.3; Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 137,
141 (S.C. 2014) (noting that “[a] majority of jurisdictions now recognize a cause of action by a
third-party beneficiary of a will or estate planning document against the lawyer whose drafting
error defeats or diminishes the client’s intent,” and holding that South Carolina law will now
recognize such causes of action, “both in tort and in contract”); cf. John H. Langbein, The Secret
Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE. L.J. 165, 185 (1997) (“The
difference between a trust and a third-party beneficiary contract is largely a lawyers’
conceptualism.”).
The fact that the heir or will beneficiary was unknown or unnamed at the time of contracting
does not prevent the eventual heir or will beneficiary from being classified as a third-party
beneficiary of the donative freedom contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 308
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“It is not essential to the creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that
he be identified when a contract containing the promise is made.”); id. § 308 cmt. a, illus. 1 (stating
that “there is no requirement of identification prior to the time for enforcement of the right” and
illustrating the point with the example of a will substitute (life insurance contract) beneficiary
whose future interest was contingent at the time of contracting); see also James Family Charitable
Found. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 956 N.E.2d 243, 244, 248 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (holding that
a charitable foundation, which was the donee of certain mutual fund shares and which alleged that
the former custodian of the shares breached its custodianship agreement with the prior owner of
the shares by delaying transfer of the shares to the charitable foundation, was a third-party
beneficiary of the custodianship agreement between the donor and the custodian and that “[i]t
makes no difference that [the] foundation was not identified as an intended beneficiary at the time
the agreement was entered into”); In re Citgo Petroleum Corp., 248 S.W.3d 769, 773, 776–77
(Tex. App. 2008) (holding that even though the arbitration contract between an employer and its
employee did not name the employer’s customer specifically, “the agreement is sufficiently clear
to establish that the parties intended to cover entities in th[e] category [of the employer’s
customers]”; therefore, the employer’s customer is a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration
contract between the employer and the employee and may compel arbitration of the employee’s
suit against the customer).
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There are two quite distinct versions of equitable estoppel that courts
have used to compel arbitration between a signatory to an arbitration
contract and a non-signatory to the contract: direct benefits estoppel and
intertwined claims estoppel.198 Only direct benefits estoppel is relevant
to the instant discussion.199 Under direct benefits estoppel theory, a
nonparty to a contract “is estopped from repudiating an arbitration clause
in a contract which he has previously embraced.”200 Thus, the nonparty
who seeks to enforce a contract may not simultaneously disavow the
arbitration clause in the contract.201 As the Supreme Court of Texas
commented in a discussion of direct benefits estoppel theory in the
arbitration context, “A nonparty cannot both have his contract and defeat
it too.”202
For example, the district court in Todd v. Steamship Mutual
Underwriting Ass’n,203 on remand from the Fifth Circuit, applied direct
benefits estoppel theory to bind Todd to the arbitration contract entered
into between Todd’s employer and the employer’s insurance company,
Steamship.204 Recall that Todd was not a party to the insurance contract
containing the arbitration clause but sued Steamship to enforce the
insurance contract to collect on a judgment that his now-insolvent
employer owed him but failed to pay.205 After finding that Louisiana law
controlled the question of whether Todd, as a non-signatory to the
198. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2003);
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 778–79 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
Alexandra Anne Hui, Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Compulsion of Arbitration, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 711, 714, 726–39 (2007) (explaining the two different strands of equitable estoppel).
199. The version of equitable estoppel referred to as “intertwined claims estoppel” is not
relevant to the instant discussion. In intertwined claims estoppel, a court estops a signatory to the
arbitration contract from avoiding arbitration with a non-signatory at the non-signatory’s
insistence when the signatory has entered into an arbitration contract with a party closely related
to the non-signatory and “the issues the nonsignatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are
intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.” Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at
779; see also Bridas, 345 F.3d at 360–61 (explaining intertwined claims estoppel).
200. Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n, No. 08-1195, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38638, at
*20 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011); accord Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779; Bridas, 345 F.3d at 361–62.
201. Todd, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38638, at *21; see also Becker v. Davis, 491 F.3d 1292,
1300 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a party relies on the terms of a written agreement in asserting the
party's claims, that party is equitably estopped from then seeking to avoid an arbitration clause
within the agreement.”).
202. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005). The party seeking to
avoid arbitration in In re Weekley Homes sued in tort rather than under the contract. See id. at 132.
Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme Court held that the party’s “prior exercise of other contractual
rights and her equitable entitlement to other contractual benefits prevents her from avoiding the
arbitration clause” contained in the contract. Id. at 135.
203. No. 08-1195, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38638 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011).
204. Id. at *1–3, *20, *32–33.
205. Id. at *1–2, *19.
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insurance contract, could be bound by the contract’s arbitration provision,
the district court rejected Todd’s argument that he could not be bound by
the arbitration clause because he had never agreed to arbitrate his dispute
with the insurance company.206 Rather, in holding that the court could
compel Todd to arbitrate as a non-signatory, the district court reasoned
that “[b]ecause Todd is seeking to enforce the terms of the contract
between Steamship and [his employer], he has embraced that contract
such that, under both Louisiana and federal case law, he is estopped from
repudiating the arbitration clause in that contract.”207
To more fully appreciate how direct benefits estoppel might be
applied in the context of testator-compelled arbitration, it is useful
initially to divide into two categories the types of claims that a will
contestant might bring. The first category consists of claims pursuant to
which the contestant seeks to increase her inheritance under the will.208
The second category consists of claims pursuant to which the contestant
seeks to increase her inheritance under the intestacy scheme.209
The first category of claims can be further subdivided into two groups:
suits to construe the will and suits that challenge a testamentary gift to
someone other than the contestant, which, if successful, would result in
the gift being redirected under the will to the contestant. In a suit to
construe the will, the contestant concedes that the will is valid and argues
for a certain understanding of the meaning of the will that would benefit
him.210 The suit might concern issues such as the identity of a
beneficiary,211 identification of the property to which a certain
beneficiary is entitled,212 or specification of the time for distribution of
property to the beneficiary.213 Application of the direct benefits estoppel
theory in the context of a suit to construe the will is straightforward: The
party seeking to have the will construed in a manner that will favor him
has embraced the will contract; thus, he is estopped from repudiating the
contract’s arbitration clause.214
206. Id. at *13, *18–19, *22.
207. Id. at *22.
208. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1074; Murphy, supra note 2, at 629.
209. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1075; Murphy, supra note 2, at 629.
210. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 555–56.
211. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barbey, 32 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (Sur. Ct. 1941) (holding that a
testator may authorize an executor to determine which employees qualify to receive certain
property under the will).
212. See, e.g., Couts v. Holland, 107 S.W. 913, 914–15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) (“The power
[that the testator gave to executors] to determine what the will means, in its every part and
provision, involves, as well, the power to decide what property it operates upon . . . .”).
213. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 555–56.
214. Cf. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 557 (“Because all of the parties to any potential
construction proceeding concede the validity of the will, a testator who includes a mediation
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Alternatively, the will contestant who seeks to increase her inheritance
under the will might argue that a testamentary gift to someone other than
the contestant should fail and, consequently, be redirected under the will
to the contestant.215 Consider, for example, a sole residuary legatee who
challenges a provision of the will that bequeaths $100,000 to A. The
residuary legatee is entitled to the portion of the probate estate that is left
over after each non-residuary beneficiary has received her gift. Thus, the
residuary legatee’s successful challenge to A’s $100,000 bequest would
increase the residuary legatee’s inheritance by $100,000. The residuary
legatee might allege that A used fraud, duress, or undue influence to
procure the challenged bequest or that the gift was the product of the
testator’s insane delusion. Such allegations, if proven, would invalidate
only A’s $100,000 bequest but not the remainder of the will.216 Where the
will contestant’s challenge pertains only to a portion of the will and the
contestant seeks to take more under the will than she would take absent
the will contest, direct benefits estoppel should bind the contestant to the
arbitration clause. The contestant seeks to enforce the portion of the will
contract that she does not challenge; accordingly, she may not
simultaneously disavow the will contract’s arbitration clause.217
The second category of claims that a will contestant might bring,
consisting of challenges pursuant to which the contestant seeks to
increase his inheritance under the intestacy statutes, can also be further
subdivided into two groups.218 The first type of challenge within this
category alleges that the testator failed to comply with the relevant
jurisdiction’s formalities for the execution of a will, and thus the will is
provision in the will can legally bind the parties to any will construction dispute.” (footnote
omitted)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874, 876, 879 (Tex.
App. 1992) (“[T]he settlor and beneficiaries of a trust [who did not sign the arbitration agreement
at issue] are bound by a clause in an account agreement [signed by the trustee] to arbitrate the
claims arising out of transactions in the trust’s account.”).
Notwithstanding the straightforward application of direct benefits estoppel to such a situation,
it might be prudent for the testator to state expressly that a beneficiary’s choice to take under the
will shall constitute acceptance of the will’s arbitration provision. Cf. Strong, Empowering
Settlors, supra note 12, at 311–12 (recommending this approach with respect to an arbitration
agreement contained in a trust).
215. One variation of this scenario would present the contestant who challenges a codicil to
a will but not the will aside from the codicil, where the will itself contains the arbitration clause.
216. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative transfer is invalid to the extent that it was procured
by undue influence, duress or fraud.”); id. § 8.1 cmt. s (“A particular donative transfer is
invalid . . . to the extent that it was the product of an insane delusion.”).
217. Cf. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 4, at 1219 (“If a party bases its
claim on any portion of the trust, then the arbitration clause will remain in effect, since it is
impossible to make a claim under the trust while simultaneously denying its validity.”).
218. See Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 560.
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of no effect.219 The second type of challenge alleges that an event or
condition at the time of the will’s execution affected the testator’s
testamentary intent—either the intent to make a will or the intent to
execute a particular dispositive scheme—and therefore some or all of the
property that the will purports to gift should pass by intestacy.220 This
second type of challenge might allege, for example, that the testator
lacked the mental capacity needed to execute a will.221 Where the testator
lacked sufficient mental capacity to execute a will, the entire will is
necessarily invalid.222 This second type of challenge also might be based
on allegations of fraud, duress, undue influence, or an insane delusion.223
A testamentary gift is invalid to the extent that it was the product of fraud,
duress, undue influence, or an insane delusion.224 Thus, each of these
conditions might result in the total invalidity of the will or merely in the
invalidity of a particular gift under the will that might then pass by
intestacy if the gift is not otherwise redirected under the will. For
example, if an heir were to argue successfully that a will’s residuary
clause was the product of fraud, duress, undue influence, or an insane
delusion, the residuary property would then pass by intestacy.
The heir who challenges a will in the hope of increasing her intestate
inheritance does not raise a claim arising under the will. One might
reason, therefore, that such an heir should not be bound by the will’s
arbitration clause.225 In the language of third-party beneficiary theory, the
testator did not intend that the heir benefit from the will contract that
contains the arbitration clause, and performance of the will contract
would not complete a gift intended for the heir. One might conclude, then,
that the heir should not be bound by the will’s arbitration clause under
third-party beneficiary theory. In the language of direct benefits estoppel
theory, the heir has not “embraced” the will contract.226 Thus, there is an
argument that the heir should not be estopped from repudiating the will
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 241.
223. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 560–61.
223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(a)
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative transfer is invalid to the extent that it was procured by undue
influence, duress or fraud.”); id. § 8.1 cmt. s (“A particular donative transfer is invalid . . . to the
extent that it was the product of an insane delusion.”).
225. See Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 98–99 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (holding that the
beneficiary of a trust was not bound by an arbitration agreement contained in a contract between
the trustee of the trust and a financial institution where the beneficiary’s claim against the financial
institution did not arise from the contract).
226. See Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n, No. 08-1195, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38638,
at *20 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011).
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contract’s arbitration clause.
The heir who challenges a will in the hope of increasing his intestate
inheritance does, however, raise a claim arising under a separate
provision of the greater donative freedom contract between the donor and
the state. This greater contract includes not only provisions governing the
passing of property by will, but also provisions governing the passing of
property by intestacy and by will substitutes, such as the revocable inter
vivos trust. As the heir seeks to take under the greater donative freedom
contract, he should be bound by any applicable arbitration clause in the
contract.227 Thus, under this Article’s theory, the heir should be bound by
a will’s arbitration provision even when the heir’s will contest seeks to
render the will a complete nullity.
The key to understanding this argument is to appreciate that the
intestacy scheme itself is an implied unilateral contract between the donor
and the state. The implied unilateral intestacy contract looks a great deal
like the implied unilateral will contract. As a means to secure a more
productive citizenry, the state offers in its probate code to distribute a
future decedent’s property in accordance with the property owner’s
implied wishes.228 The property owner accepts and provides
consideration for the intestacy contract by performance, specifically by
being economically productive and by saving and investing her estate
rather than consuming it. Under the broad reasoning of Woolley and its
progeny, the intestacy contract is formed even if neither the property
owner specifically nor the citizenry generally is conversant with the
intricacies of the state’s intestacy statutes.229 Rather, the critical factor is
that the state has created a situation that is “instinct with an obligation”230
in conveying to the citizenry the general sense that the state will promote
the implied wishes of each property owner by allowing the property
owner’s closest relations to succeed to her intestate estate at her death.
This understanding of the nature of the implied unilateral intestacy
contract between the donor and the state leads to the conclusion that the
heir who seeks to increase his intestate inheritance by challenging a will
should be bound by the will’s arbitration clause under third-party
beneficiary theory. The state enacts its intestacy statutes with the intent
that the statutes will benefit the heir whose very status as heir is a creature
of the statutes. Moreover, performance of the intestacy statutes would
227. Cf. Elder v. Elder, 120 A.2d 815, 819 (R.I. 1956) (discussing the validity of a no-contest
clause and commenting that “[i]t is also a familiar principle of equity that one may not claim a
gift from the bounty of a testator to which he had no original right, while at the same time attacking
the validity of the instrument which makes the gift. He must take the devise or bequest together
with its burden as well as its benefits.”).
228. See Sitkoff, supra note 22, at 645.
229. See supra notes 108–30 and accompanying text (discussing Woolley and its progeny).
230. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980)
(quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)).
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complete a gift intended for the heir. Thus, the heir is a third-party
beneficiary of the intestacy provisions of the greater donative freedom
contract. As the heir seeks to assert rights arising from the greater
donative freedom contract, he should be bound by the arbitration clause
contained in the will contract provisions of the greater donative freedom
contract.
The same understanding of the nature of the implied unilateral
intestacy contract between the donor and the state also leads to the
conclusion that the heir who seeks to increase her intestate inheritance by
challenging a will should be bound by the will’s arbitration clause under
direct benefits estoppel theory. The heir’s will contest challenges only a
portion of the greater donative freedom contract. Indeed, the heir seeks to
enforce the portion of the greater donative freedom contract that she does
not challenge. Accordingly, having embraced the greater donative
freedom contract, even if only in part, she may not simultaneously
disavow the greater donative freedom contract’s arbitration clause.231
Thus, this Article’s implied unilateral contract theory enables
enforcement of a will’s arbitration clause in circumstances where the
clause would not be enforceable under the various theories discussed in
Part I that seek to bind the donee to a will’s arbitration provision in the
absence of any contract. Such theories are nonstarters if the court holds
that the governing arbitration statute makes enforceable only arbitration
provisions contained in a contract. Moreover, such theories would not
allow for testator-compelled arbitration where the will contestant seeks
by his contest to increase his intestate inheritance.232 Given the
prevalence of such claims in the universe of will contests, such theories
are of limited utility.
This Article’s implied unilateral contract theory, however, will not
mandate arbitration of all challenges to a will that contains a testatorcompelled arbitration provision. To conclude that a will contestant should
be bound by a will’s arbitration clause, whether under third-party
beneficiary theory, direct benefits estoppel theory, or both, is not
necessarily to conclude that the will contestant must arbitrate her will
contest. Rather, under separability theory, a court rather than an arbitrator
should decide the will contestant’s claim where the contest specifically
or necessarily challenges the will’s arbitration provision.233
231. It is of no moment that some of the terms of the intestacy contract are not written. What
matters under the FAA and state arbitration law is that the arbitration clause itself is “[a] written
provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract.” See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
232. See supra notes 46–73 and accompanying text.
233. The parties to an arbitration contract may agree to a delegation clause that will alter the
separability scheme so that an arbitrator will have the authority to decide even a challenge to the
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IV. SEPARABILITY AND THE ARBITRATION OF WILL CONTESTS
Scholars and practitioners who know a great deal about the law of
donative transfers but little or nothing about the law of arbitration might
have difficulty comprehending the notion that an arbitrator who derives
his authority from a will or trust might have the power to adjudicate a
challenge to the validity of that will or trust.234 After all, if the arbitrator
determines that the donative instrument is not valid, is it not necessarily
the case that the arbitrator (who derives his authority from the donative
instrument) never had any authority to adjudicate the dispute? Such an
understanding among donative transfers experts that an arbitrator may not
adjudicate the validity of an instrument from which he derives his
authority to serve as arbitrator may account, in part, for the limited nature
of recently proposed and enacted statutory reforms validating arbitration
clauses found in wills and trusts—ACTEC’s Model Enforceability Act as
well as the Arizona, Florida, Missouri, and New Hampshire statutes
discussed above exclude challenges to the validity of the donative
instrument.235
The arbitration doctrine of separability, however, suggests that an
arbitrator may well have the authority to adjudicate a challenge to the
validity of a will or trust from which her authority to serve as arbitrator
arises.236 In short, the doctrine of separability provides that an arbitration
clause found within a contract is itself a contract separate and apart from
the container contract within which it is found.237 Thus, under the
separability doctrine, a challenge to the validity of the container contract
is not a challenge to the arbitration clause found within the container
arbitration agreement. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (“[T]he
delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration
agreement.”). In such a case, the court will have the authority to decide only a challenge specific
to the delegation clause. Id. at 68–72; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WILLS AND TRUSTS
ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION P ROCEDURES R. 7(a) (2012), https://www.adr.org/aaa/Show
Property?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_024438 (“The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his
or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity
of the arbitration agreement.”). For a more extensive discussion of delegation clauses in the
context of will or trust dispute arbitration, see Spitko, Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes, supra
note 8.
234. Cf. S.I. Strong, Mandatory Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes: Improving
Arbitrability and Enforceability Through Proper Procedural Choices, 28 ARB. INT’L 591, 594
(2012) (offering as an explanation for why the arbitral community has not successfully worked to
provide a set of specialized arbitral rules for arbitration of internal trust disputes, “that the
traditional isolation of trust law has meant that few specialists in arbitration were experienced
enough in trust law to undertake this kind of analysis”).
235. See supra notes 75–93 and accompanying text.
236. See Spitko, Protecting the Abhorrent Testator, supra note 6, at 303–07.
237. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006).
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contract.238
In 1967, in the landmark case of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co.,239 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA
provides for such a separability scheme in cases to which the FAA
applies.240 In Prima Paint, the Court focused its analysis on Section 4 of
the FAA, which provides that a court hearing a motion to compel
arbitration “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue . . . shall make
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the agreement.”241 Section 4 further provides that when “the
making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to
perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the
trial thereof.”242 The Court interpreted this language to mean that if a
party directs a claim of invalidity specifically at the arbitration provision
of the contract, then a court may adjudicate the claim.243 The Court went
on to conclude, however, that “the plain meaning of the statute” required
that in a case such as the one before it, in which a party alleged fraud in
the inducement of the entire contract, an arbitrator rather than a court
should resolve the claim.244 Nearly forty years later, in Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,245 the Court made clear that Prima Paint’s
rule of separability applies not only in a case in which a party alleges that
the container contract is voidable but also in a case in which a party
alleges that the container contract is void ab initio, such as where a party
alleges the illegality of the container contract.246
Thus, under the doctrine of separability, a court rather than an
arbitrator should decide a challenge that goes specifically to the will’s
arbitration clause. Conversely, an arbitrator rather than a court should
decide any claim that challenges a specific provision of the will other than
the arbitration clause. Such a claim undeniably does not put the making
of the arbitration clause in issue.
In the context of a will contest that seeks to invalidate the will as a
whole, application of the separability doctrine should require that an
arbitrator decides the will contest unless the contest necessarily
238. Id. at 445–46.
239. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
240. Id. at 402–04. The RUAA expressly adopts the separability scheme. See UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (“An arbitrator shall decide whether a
condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.”).
241. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 n.11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)).
242. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
243. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04.
244. Id. at 404.
245. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
246. See id. at 446–49.
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implicates the arbitration provision. Consider first a challenge to a will
asserting that the entire will is invalid because the testator failed to
comply with the formalities statutorily required for the execution of a
will—specifically, that two witnesses did not sign the will. An arbitration
contract need not be witnessed. Thus, the will contest does not implicate
the arbitration clause even if the will containing the clause is alleged to
be entirely invalid. An arbitrator, therefore, should decide the execution
challenge.
Consider another challenge alleging that a testator’s entire dispositive
scheme is the product of fraud in the inducement, duress, undue
influence, or an insane delusion. If any such allegation is proven to be
true, the testator’s will in its entirety should be invalid.247 Nonetheless,
the allegation does not implicate the will’s arbitration provision as there
is no allegation that the arbitration provision specifically is the product of
fraud in the inducement, duress, undue influence, or an insane delusion.
Conceptually, it makes sense to argue that fraud in the inducement,
duress, undue influence, or an insane delusion affected the dispositive
scheme but did not affect the arbitration provision. Thus, an arbitrator
should decide the fraud, duress, undue influence, or insane delusion
challenge.
A mental capacity challenge to a will containing an arbitration clause
presents a more difficult separability puzzle.248 As noted above, a
testator’s lack of mental capacity necessarily invalidates her entire will
executed while the testator lacked mental capacity.249 Thus, a will
contestant’s mental capacity challenge necessarily goes to the entire will.
One might conclude, therefore, that a straightforward application of
Prima Paint requires that an arbitrator decide the mental capacity
challenge to a will where the will contains an arbitration clause.250
247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 8.1 cmt.
s, 8.3(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
248. The Supreme Court has noted that its separability cases have dealt with the issue of
whether a contract is valid but not with the issue of “whether any agreement . . . was ever
concluded.” Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444 n.1. In Buckeye, the Court included “whether the signor
lacked the mental capacity to assent” as an example of an issue related to the conclusion of a
contract. Id. Professor Stephen Ware has argued that the Court’s broader FAA jurisprudence
“should be read to converge into a coherent whole consisting of the rule that the separability
doctrine does not apply to the question whether a particular party formed a contract containing an
arbitration clause but does apply to questions about defenses to the enforcement of that contract.”
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 115 (2007). However, Professor Ware has argued further that
incapacity is a defense to contract enforcement and thus would fall within the list of questions to
which the separability doctrine would apply under such an approach. See id. at 115–16, 118–19.
249. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
250. A Pennsylvania superior court has held on public policy grounds that an arbitrator may
not decide issues of mental capacity. In re Trust of Harold, 604 A.2d 263, 265–67 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
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Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Primerica
Life Insurance Co. v. Brown251 applied Prima Paint to require arbitration
of a breach of contract claim where the contract at issue contained an
arbitration clause252 even though the district court had found that the party
seeking to avoid arbitration “ha[d] been profoundly retarded since birth”
and lacked the mental capacity to enter into a contract under the relevant
state law.253 In holding that the merits of the underlying dispute were for
the arbitrator rather than for the district court to decide, the Fifth Circuit
first noted that “Brown’s capacity defense is a defense to his entire
agreement with CitiFinancial and not a specific challenge to the
arbitration clause.”254 The court went on to reason that “[t]herefore,
Brown’s capacity defense is part of the underlying dispute between the
parties which, in light of Prima Paint and its progeny, must be submitted
to the arbitrator.”255
With respect to separability, however, a mental capacity defense to
contract enforcement can be distinguished meaningfully from the fraud
and illegality defenses to contract enforcement presented respectively in
Prima Paint and Buckeye.256 In sum, unlike with respect to a fraud in the
inducement defense or an illegality defense, separability with respect to
a mental capacity defense is conceptually nonsensical.257 Fraud that
induces a container contract is most unlikely to relate in any specific way
to the contract’s arbitration clause. Thus, in Prima Paint, the party
seeking to avoid arbitration of its fraud claim pled fraud in the
inducement relating to the contract as a whole but, on the facts alleged,
could not have pled fraud relating to the contract’s arbitration
1992). The court expressed its concern with “unwanted ramifications” of an arbitrator’s finding
of incompetency such as uncertainty as to whether the arbitrator might appoint a guardian for the
donor and, if so, whether the guardian might commit the donor to a hospital or otherwise prescribe
medical treatment for the donor. Id. at 267. These concerns are irrelevant when the donor is
deceased as in the case of testator-compelled arbitration.
251. 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002).
252. Id. at 470–71.
253. Id. at 471; id. at 472 (Dennis, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 472 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
255. Id.
256. Cf. Love & Sterk, supra note 3, at 561 (arguing that courts are unlikely to apply the
separability doctrine in the context of a will contest “because contestants are typically arguing
that the testator had no capacity to execute the will or that the will reflects the wishes of someone
other than the testator; and, unlike the situation of an arbitration clause embedded in an otherwise
unenforceable contract, the disputing parties themselves never agreed to the use of the process”).
257. Autumn Smith, You Can’t Judge Me: Mental Capacity Challenges to Arbitration
Provisions, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 1051, 1076 (2004) (“In most situations, a mental capacity
challenge cannot logically be directed at a specific portion of a contract, where conduct-based
defenses clearly can.”).
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provision.258 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how illegality infecting
a purported container contract might relate specifically to the contract’s
arbitration provision. Therefore, the parties in Buckeye seeking to avoid
arbitration of their illegality claim pled the illegality of the purported
container contract but, on the facts alleged, could not have pled the
illegality of the contract’s arbitration provision.259
In contrast, the alleged facts that give rise to a mental capacity
challenge to a contract necessarily will also give rise to a mental capacity
challenge to the contract’s arbitration provision.260 Thus, any party who
can plead facts alleging that she lacked the mental capacity to enter into
a contract can also plead facts alleging that she specifically lacked the
mental capacity to enter into the contract’s arbitration clause. The latter
pleading should suffice to put “the making of the arbitration
agreement . . . in issue” in the words of Section 4 of the FAA.261 The
reality that the very same facts will support both a conclusion that a party
lacked the mental capacity to enter into a contract, and also a conclusion
that the party specifically lacked the mental capacity to enter into the
arbitration clause suggests that Primerica’s reasoning grounding its
application of Prima Paint is simplistic. The Primerica court failed to
address adequately the argument that a mental capacity defense is both a
defense to the entire contract and a specific challenge to the contract’s
arbitration clause.262
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recognized this
fundamental distinction between a mental capacity defense and a contract
258. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1967)
(discussing the facts giving rise to Prima Paint’s claim that Flood & Conklin fraudulently induced
their container contract by representing “that it was solvent and able to perform its contractual
obligations, whereas it was in fact insolvent and intended to file a [bankruptcy] petition”).
259. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442–43 (2006)
(discussing the facts giving rise to the allegation that “Buckeye charged usurious interest rates
and that the [container contract at issue] violated various Florida lending and consumer-protection
laws, rendering it criminal on its face”).
260. Alan Scott Rau, “Separability” in the United States Supreme Court, 2006 STOCKHOLM
INT’L ARB. REV. 1, 15–17 (arguing that Prima Paint “does not merely preserve for the courts
challenges that are ‘restricted’ or ‘limited’ to ‘just’ the arbitration clause alone” but rather
“preserves for the courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an agreement to arbitrate into
question” and citing a mental capacity challenge as such a claim); Smith, supra note 256, at 1073
(“A litigant would be unable to make an independent challenge to an arbitration agreement based
on his or her mental capacity, as a litigant’s mental capacity to sign a contract and mental capacity
to enter into an arbitration agreement contained in that contract will be identical in most cases.”).
261. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
262. See Rau, supra note 260, at 14–15 & n.40 (describing Primerica as “[a]n astonishing
decision” and arguing that “it should be obvious that a challenge can be ‘to the arbitration clause
itself’ without being ‘specifically to [its] arbitration provision[s]’” (quoting Buckeye, 546 U.S. at
445–46)).
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defense such as fraud in the inducement with respect to a separability
analysis. In Spahr v. Secco,263 the Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Primerica and held that Prima Paint’s
separability rule does not apply where a party has asserted a mental
capacity defense to a contract’s enforcement.264 In concluding that “the
analytical formula developed in Prima Paint cannot be applied with
precision when a party contends that an entire contract containing an
arbitration provision is unenforceable because he or she lacked the mental
capacity to enter into the contract,” the court found it critical that
“[u]nlike a claim of fraud in the inducement, which can be directed at
individual provisions in a contract, a mental capacity challenge can
logically be directed only at the entire contract.”265 Thus, the court held
that a “mental incapacity defense naturally goes to both the entire contract
and the specific agreement to arbitrate in the contract” and necessarily
places the agreement to arbitrate in issue.266
The blanket rule in Spahr should be qualified for present purposes to
take account of temporal issues that may arise in will contests. Assume,
for example, that the relevant arbitration provision appears in a codicil
executed subsequent to the execution of the contested will. In theory, a
testator might lack sufficient mental capacity at one moment yet possess
sufficient capacity the next.267 An allegation that the testator lacked the
mental capacity necessary to execute the will, therefore, would not be a
mental capacity challenge specific to the arbitration clause contained in
the codicil. Assume in the alternative, for example, that the arbitration
clause is contained in a will executed prior to a contested codicil.
Similarly, an allegation that the testator lacked the mental capacity
needed to execute the codicil would not be a mental capacity challenge
specific to the arbitration clause contained in the will.
In sum, when a will contestant specifically challenges the validity of
an arbitration clause found in the will, a court should decide the challenge
to the arbitration clause. A court also should decide a challenge to the will
that necessarily also challenges the validity of the arbitration clause found
in the will. Otherwise, the arbitrator, whose authority to adjudicate arises
from the will, should decide the will contest.
CONCLUSION
A consensus is developing in the case law, the academic commentary,
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1273.
Id.
ATKINSON, supra note 29, at 241.
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and the statutory reform movement that a testator’s provision in her will
mandating arbitration of any challenge to the will should not be
enforceable against a beneficiary who has not agreed to the arbitration
provision, at least where the contestant, by his contest, seeks to increase
his inheritance outside the will.268 Grounding this consensus is the
understanding that a will is not a contract. This understanding has
influenced not only the case law but also the scholarship and legal reform
efforts focusing on the issue.269
This Article argues that a will is a contract, albeit not one between the
testator and her beneficiary. A will is part of an implied unilateral contract
between the testator and the state in which the state offers to honor the
testator’s donative intent and the testator accepts and provides
consideration for the offer by creating and preserving wealth.
Importantly, the greater donative freedom contract of which the will is a
part also provides for the distribution of an individual’s intestate property
in line with the individual’s imputed intent should the individual fail to
execute an effective estate plan. Similar to the testator, the property
owner who has failed to make an effective estate plan accepts this offer
of intestate distribution through her industry and thrift. This Article’s
theory borrows from the law respecting implied unilateral contracts
arising from employee handbooks in concluding that it should be of no
moment that the property owner is unfamiliar with the specifics of a state
probate code. Rather, the critical factor should be that the state has,
through its offer to respect donative intent, created an atmosphere that is
“instinct with an obligation” and that encourages diligence and the
prudent management of wealth.
The conclusion that a will is a contract grounds this Article’s
additional argument that the FAA and state arbitration statutes require
enforcement of testator-compelled arbitration provisions contained in a
will. Settled arbitration law in conjunction with third-party beneficiary
theory or direct benefits estoppel theory supports binding the beneficiary
to the will’s arbitration contract. Neither the fact that the beneficiary has
not signed the will nor the fact that the testator’s acceptance of the
donative freedom contract is implied defeats this argument.
That a will is a contract also supports a normative argument that the
law should enforce testator-compelled arbitration provisions contained in
a will. It is only fair that one who claims a right arising under a contract
be subject to the arbitration provision relating to claims arising under that
contract. This normative argument is bolstered by conditional gift theory,
which provides a cardinal principle in the law of donative transfers—the
268. See supra Part I.
269. See supra Part I.
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rights of the donee are derivative of and subordinate to the rights of the
donor.270
Finally, an arbitrator whose authority to arbitrate arises from a will
should have the power to adjudicate a challenge to the validity of that will
unless the challenge speaks specifically to the validity of the arbitration
provision. Pursuant to the arbitration doctrine of separability, the
arbitration provision within a will should be understood to be a contract
separate and apart from the will. A challenge to the validity of the will
contract as a whole may also focus specifically on the validity of the
arbitration contract. Where the will contest does not focus specifically on
the validity of the will’s arbitration provision, the arbitrator’s authority
has gone unchallenged.
Despite the merits of enforcing testator-compelled arbitration
provisions contained in a will, the enforceability of such provisions
remains an unresolved issue in most jurisdictions.271 This uncertainty
imperils the arbitration virtues of speed, economy, and finality, and it
threatens to add a layer of cost and delay to the contest of a will. Thus,
this uncertainty likely discourages testators from including arbitration
provisions in their wills. Therefore, legislation authorizing testatorcompelled arbitration, including in cases where the contestant seeks to
increase his inheritance outside of the will, would bring much needed
certainty to the law in this area.

270. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

51

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/2

52

